Rob Lanphier's control letter

[Markus Schulze]

Here is an example to show why voters would truncate, if
a Condorcet Criterion Method is used:

Case 1:

47 voters vote ABC.
10 voters vote BAC.
 8 voters vote BCA.
35 voters vote CBA.

A:B=47:53.
A:C=57:43.
B:C=65:35.

B wins against A and against C in the pairwise comparison. Thus B
is the Condorcet winner.

Case 2:

Now the 47 voters, who prefer A most, do truncate.

47 voters vote A.
10 voters vote BAC.
 8 voters vote BCA.
35 voters vote CBA.

A:B=47:53.
A:C=57:43.
B:C=18:35.

Now there is a tie between A, B, and C. Whether A is elected, 
depends on the used tie breaker. But if Condorcet/Smith is
used, then A is elected.

I believe, that to every tie breaker method it is possible to
create an example, where truncation makes sense.

Markus Schulze (schulze at speedy.physik.tu-berlin.de)