First Choices tiebreaker

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

After rethinking the problem of Condorcet circular ties, I note that such
ties occur because any tiebreaker method using additional rankings beyond the
first choice ranking has the potential for strategic voting (i.e. attempted
candidate manipulation of such additional rankings depending on the
tiebreaker that uses such additional rankings-- a sort of manipulation-
tiebreaker method feedback loop). 

A possible remedy if there is a circular tie would be to ignore the
additional rankings.

Namely, 
1. Do the standard head to head pairings.
2. Drop all candidates who cannot beat or tie any other candidate.
3. If there is a circular tie, then drop the candidate with the lowest number
of first choice votes. (Such candidate has had his/her chance to beat the
other candidates).
4. Relook at the head to head pairings of the candidates remaining in the
circular tie.
5. If the circular tie continues, then move up the rankings of the candidate
dropped in step 3 (or step 6). (e.g. a second choice vote becomes a revised
first choice vote on a ballot that has the dropped candidate as the first
choice candidate).
6. Drop the candidate with the lowest number of revised first choice votes.
7. Repeat steps 4, 5 and 6 as necessary.

Relative rankings would remain intact.  Moving up the votes in step 5 after a
choice is dropped would encourage the making of additional rankings and
discourage truncated votes (i.e. a single winner just might end up with a
majority of all the votes).

As much as it might shock some folks, the above is a combination of the head
to head part of Condorcet along with the often attacked Instant Run-off.