MOAV "criterion"?

Fri Feb 14 20:56:07 PST 1997

Mr. Eppley wrote:
Demorep hasn't shown he understands majority rule.  Demorep won't post a
clear definition of his MOAV criterion, which, I presume, is his
interpretation of majority rule.

D-- Definition of MOAV (again for Mr. Eppley)-- In a yes/no vote, if an
executive or judicial office candidate get can a majority yes vote of all the
voters, then he/she gets a majority of all votes (MOAV).
Example of MOAV-  100 voters
           Yes         No 
S         56          41
T         42          35         
U         40          55
V         35          45         
W         52         42
X          47         46
Y          55         42
Z          51         49
S, W, Y and Z are acceptable by a majority of all the voters. Such 4
candidates would then go head to head.
D wrote earlier-
The average voter has no interest in what any single winner method is called,
such as the XX//YY//ZZ method,  but has some minimal comprehension,
notwithstanding terrible public schools, of majority rule (as compared to
plurality and Condorcet's distinct possibility of producing winners having
support that is a little more than plurality (roughly in the 37-45 percent of
all voters range due to truncated votes) but a little less than a majority of
all the voters- i.e. beating each other candidate by at least 51 of 100
votes). For every Nader 37-45 percent winner it  is just as likely to get a
37-45 percent Gingrich winner with plain Condorcet.
Mr. Eppley wrote:
Demorep now seems to be claiming that a candidate must receive a majority *in
every pairing* as well as a majority of Yes votes in order to satisfy MOAV. 
D- Mr. Eppley is in error again. Continuing the above S, W, Y and Z example.
In their pairings they do not need to get a majority of all the votes (51) to
continue. Relative majorities will have to do-- such as W v. Z might be 49 v.
47 so W would win such pairing.
Mr. Eppley wrote:
Here's an example which Demorep would probably claim points out some majority
rule violation of Condorcet:
   20:  A(B=C)
   15:  ABC
   16:  BAC
   16:  BCA
   23:  CBA
   10:  C(B=A)

Since there is no yes/no vote listed, I cannot tell who gets a MOAV and thus
cannot tell who goes on to have head to head pairings.

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