We Will Reveal No Preference Before Its Time
John De Lasaux
jdelsey at primenet.com
Sat Apr 26 09:50:50 PDT 1997
This is the most crucial issue in the whole elections business.
If there is *any* chance that a voter's lower preference could be revealed
too soon, or could influence the earlier selections in any way, then the
method is not viable.
Everyone on the list should sign up for this idea ... then we can stop
flogging unusable methods go on to make decisions on the remaining specific
At 04:39 AM 4/26/97 -0400, election-methods-list at eskimo.com wrote:
>Hugh Tobin wrote:
> It is not a matter of transferring votes, just a rule that if A
>is ranked higher than B on a ballot, then A gets one vote against B.
> You are on thin ice Hugh - you are saying "by defination" it is not a
>matter of transferring votes.
> But the point is minor - the major problem with Condorcet is the same
>- voters are being asked to give support to lower preferences when their
>number one preference is still a contender - people will not like to do
>this - enough will rebel to render Condorcet moot.
> I am thinking that I will adopt a battle cry:
> "Secret Ballots - Secret Preferences"
> If you believe in the secret ballot then maybe you should also believe
>in the secret lower preferences. This can be done by the computer software
>- the program can be written so that it will not reveal lower preferences
>until the first preference candidate is no longer a contender.
> "We Will Reveal No Preference Before Its Time"
> Now I have a second battle cry.
>Donald Eric Davison of New Democracy at http://www.mich.com/~donald
>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
John De Lasaux
"If you're happy and you know it,
clank your chains"........Ed Wolfe
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