Presidential 2-method vote

Mike Ossipoff dfb at
Mon Nov 25 01:11:14 PST 1996

Tom pointed out that, there could conceivably be a circular tie
in which the winner by IRO would beat the winner by Condorcet
in the 2nd balloting between those 2 winners. 

Well sure, in a natural circular tie, the winner by IRO is
just as likely to beat the winner by Condorcet as vice-versa.

But in a _strategic_ circular tie, a circular tie where there's
a candidate who'd beat each one of the others in separate
2-candidate races, a candidate who, when compared separately
to each one of the others is preferred to hir by more voters
than vice-versa--well Condorcet does an excellent job of
electing that "universal winner", and IRO does a lousy
job. One reason why Condorcet does such a good job is
that strategizers in Condorcet's method can't do anything
about the fact that their favorite has a majority against
it, when a majority has ranked the universal winner over
that candidate, and nor can they engineer a fake majority]
against anyone else, at least not without the help of the
victims of that strategy. And truncation, in Condorcet
can _never_ elect a candidate over whom a majority have
ranked the universal winner. So when there's a strategic
circular tie, as defined above, and when IRO & Condorcet
have picked different winners, it's a very safe bet that
the winner by Condorcet will be the one that the people
choose in that 2nd balloting between those 2 winners.

Of course it goes without saying that if 1 candidate actually
beats everyone, and there's no circular tie, in the 1st
election, then Condorcet's choice is a sure thing to beat
IRO's choice.

So there's only 1 case where IRO has an even chance, or even
anything approaching an even chance, to have its winner
win in the 2nd balloting: A natural circular tie.

But a natural circular tie is a time when there's no right
answer. It'a a chaotic, bottom-end, pessimistic situation
when the winner has to be a loser. Does it make any difference
who wins in a natural circular tie? I claim it doesn't. Everyone
is beaten. The people, as a whole, don't know what the hell
they want.

Oh yes, there's 1 thing that, it seems to me, is important
, even in a natural circular tie: It's still true that
if a majority indicate that they'd rather have A than B,
and if we choose A or B, then it should be A. Even in
a natural circular tie, it's still true that Condorcet
is the only method (along with its cousin, Simpson-Kramer)
that will never unnecessarily violate that basic democratic

So if there's 1 majority rejected candidate, then IRO
might elect hir, but Condorcet won't. If there's just
one candidate who isn't majority rejected, Condorcet
will elect hir, but IRO might not. Aside from that, I
claim it doesn't matter what happens in a natural circular

So then, when it matters, Condorcet's choice is the one
that the people will choose in that 2nd balloting.

[Again I ask Tom to forward this reply to the people in
that distribution list. If I tried using the "group-reply"
option, a copy would be sent to:
"distribution list at", or
"distribution list at, and that incorrect address
would result in the entire transmission being aborted.
The only way that I could send my reply to the people
in that distribution list would be if they were
individually listed in the Cc: line, by their
separate e-mail addresses. Or if I succeeded in typing
all of their e-mail addresses correctly (I have no backspace
when writing the Cc: line or editing it). So far I haven't
succeeded in typing all of their addresses correctly. If
there's 1 error, then nothing gets sent].



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