y/n strategic instability. 6-Candidate example.

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Sun Nov 17 17:20:32 PST 1996

1. Plain Condorcet only makes relative rankings no matter how much is the
"absolute" support for any candidate.

2. The competitors (top 2 runoff, approval voting, instant run-off) to plain
Condorcet all can routinely produce a majority winner (who in many cases will
not be the Condorcet winner).

3. Plain Condorcet has a major problem with the strategies involving
candidates having a high plurality of first choice votes (or candidates
having a nearly equal number of first choice votes) and truncated votes.
1.   A 49, B 50, C 1 (an extreme example)
2.   A 45, B 41, C 14
3.   A 34, B 33, C 33 
Each of the high plurality or nearly equal candidates will tell their
supporters not to vote for any other candidate while attempting to get votes
from the candidate(s) who have few first choice votes.
Regarding circular ties and truncated votes- See Subj:  Re: Circular Tie
Percentages???  Date:  Sun, Nov 17, 1996 2:48 AM EDT by Mr. Ossipoff. 

4. A plain Condorcet tie breaker winner will by definition have been defeated
by at least one other candidate (if the tie breaker is the fewest votes
against in his/her worst defeat).  

Is Mr. Ossipoff ready to take the total political heat from the media, the
defeated candidates and the voters who voted to defeat such winner if and
when such an event occurs ?

Is there no strategic instability in plain Condorcet ?

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