DEMOREP1 at aol.com
DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Thu Nov 7 20:47:12 PST 1996
Demorep1- Generally--- My 1. is roughly Approval plus Condorcet for the
majority approved candidates (with some sort of tie breaker if there are 3 or
more tied majority approved candidates).
My 2. is limited Approval.
My very weak 3. is IRO if 1. and 2. are impossible to implement.
There is a technology component to the various methods. Not all private
groups or all governments at all times will have the technology and/or the
patience to input high tech votes and do all the Condorcet pairings.
Example- In Rwanda-Zaire with the mass killings, mass disease, mass
starvation, etc. the governments/gangs presumably have a low priority in
having a computer do a Condorcet election.
Mr. Eppley-- What's your rating of Condorcet? Less than 1?
Demorep1- see above.
I have a few questions regarding the Majority Approval standard (and the
similar standard, Majority Disapproval):
Case 1: No candidates are majority-approved.
1.1 Why do you think a good candidate who would be majority-approved in a
re-election can be found? What barriers would keep such a good "white
knight" from competing in the first election but not prevent him/her from
competing in the re-election?
Demorep1- I never brought up anything about disqualifying anybody for
re-election. Not sure where you got that idea.
Mr. Eppley- 1.2 Are you concerned that the voters would "tactically" or
"capriciously" vote to majority-disapprove all the candidates even though
there's a decent compromise running?
30: A|BC <-- these disapprove the compromise B
30: C|BA <-- these disapprove the compromise B
Enough voters might opt to have no winner indefinitely rather than
compromise, and ensure no one will ever win. Maybe some voters will prefer
anarchy over compromise.
I am assuming that disapproved candidates are to the right of the "I".
A B C
30: A|BC 30
15: AB|C 15 15
10: B| 10
15: CB|A 15 15
30: C|BA 30
Tots 45 45 45
All 3 do not have majority approval.
Case 2: At least one candidate is majority-approved (or would
be, except that the "plain" ballots don't allow expression of
2.1 Are you concerned that plain Condorcet might elect a disapproved
candidate when there's at least one approved candidate running (e.g., Hitler
vs Stalin vs George Washington)?
Demorep1- One cannot tell whether or not a candidate is majority approved
until there is a vote. George Washington might be the B in the Hippo series
example of 46 ABC, 20 B, 34 CBA with a 100 approval. See my earlier Hippo
Mr. Eppley--If so, would you provide an example which illustrates this
scenario? If not, would you agree that Condorcet's counting of pairwise
preferences instead of first choices, and its selection of smallest "largest
votes against in a pair-loss", already does a good job of selecting the
majority-approved candidate, even when the voters can't express approval?
Demorep1- A good job is not guaranteed unless there is a majority approval
vote. Rank voting only shows relative support and not absolute support (on a
+100 percent to a -100 percent scale). Simple approval indicates a rating
Simple disapproval indicates a rating below zero.
A,B,C Examples, V=Voter
V1 +100, +99, +95
V2 +50, +5, +1
V3 -1, -5, -50
V4 -95, -99, -100
V5 +50, +20, -30
Are the candidates really 1, 2, 3 in the minds of each voter ? Hardly. C is
disapproved by a majority. V4 really dislikes all of the candidates.
Since percentage ratings cannot be used due to the tendancy to rate
candidates as +100 or -100, an approval/disapproval vote will only remove the
below zero candidates.
There may be a lot of elections with +60, +50, +40 type candidates running
since G. Washington type candidates are scarce (and even he had many critics
while he was alive).
Once again any SW reform should be nonpartisan (and leave the partisan
rhetoric to legislative bodies elected with P.R.).
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