Condorcet(x( ))

[Mike Ossipoff]

Lucien Saumur writes:
> 
> In an article, dfb at bbs.cruzio.com (Mike Ossipoff) writes:
> 
> >Lucien Saumur writes:
> >> 
> >>           I do not understand what you mean by
> >> vote-against.
> >
> >Condorcet's method, as I've defined it, says that:
> >
> >If no 1 candidate beats each one of the others, then the winner is
> >the candidate who has the fewest voters ranking over him someone who
> >beats him.
> >
> >In other words, for each candidate, determine which candidate who beats
> >him is ranked over him by the most voters. The number of voters ranking
> >that other candidate over him is the measure of how beaten he is. The 
> >winner is the candidate least beaten by that measure.
> >
> >Because, in each pairwise comparison in which X is beaten, Condorcet's
> >circular-tie-breaker counts only the votes for the other candidate over
> >X, I call that "votes-against".
> 
>           Did Condorcet propose this tie-breaking scheme?


Condorcet proposed scoring the candidates according to their worst
defeats. He didn't specify exactly how to measure those defeats
(votes-against, margins, votes-for, ratios). My votes-against
proposal is a version of Condorcet's method, and is consistent
with his proposal. As I've often said, there are important
reasons for using votes-against, and I've repeated them many
times on this list.

> 
>           I find this scheme artificial. While circular

Artificial? Voting systems are invented by people, not picked
on trees.

Look, in the U.S., this coming November, millions of progressives,
people who don't much like Clinton, are going to vote for him. Why?
Because they're willing to throw away their opportunity to vote for
someone they like better, in order to vote against someone they
dislike more. Tell them that's artificial, but they'll still do
it. Condorcet, by counting votes-against, does what those people
so desperately insist on, while still letting them vote their
favorite in 1st place.


> ties are logically possible, I am not sure that they are
> probable nor do I know what they would mean. I am inclined

I've showed you several times that the common practice of truncation
will predictably often cause circular ties, even when there's
a Condorcet winner (candidate who, when compared separately to each
one of the others, is preferred to him/her by more voters than vice-versa).

But even in a "natural circular tie", the votes-against scoring will
carry out majority rule, while your proposals won't. Your proposals
being drawing lots, and votes-for. Votes-for will, as Steve pointed
out, work very similar to MPV. 


> to think that they would mean that the voters have no great
> preference between the candidates involved in the tie. If
> my assumption is correct, then the winner may more simply
> and reasonably be decided by drawing lots.

Yes, if you don't respect majority rule, and if you don't care
to try to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem.

Steve's many-candidate example demonstrated why votes-for
would still retain the lesser-of-2-evils problem. I've shown
you in past posts why your random choice would keep the
lesser-of-2-evils problem.


> 
> __________________________________________
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>           http://www.igs.net/~lsaumur/
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