Condorcet(x( ))

Mike Ossipoff dfb at bbs.cruzio.com
Sun May 19 15:54:18 PDT 1996


Certainly, when one ranks 2 candidates equally in one's ranking,
or when one doesn't rank either of them, there are innumerable
ways this could be scored, just as there are innumberable ways,
in general, that ranked ballots could be scored.

I chose, for my Condorcet proposal, to not count any preferences
not expressed by the voter, for 2 reasons:

1. Why count, on the voter's behalf, what he didn't say?

2. Condorcet would lose its lesser-of-2-evils properties if
voters were counted as giving preference votes that they
never indicated.

***

p.s.: The lesser-of-2-evils problem is showing up in Russia, in
a big way. Someone whose policies are close to those of Yeltsin
is refusing to step down. If his voters, likewise, refuse to 
use "drastic defensive strategy", if they refuse to vote for Yeltsin
instead of him, then the voters of that particular ideology could 
lose--because of the lesser-of-2-evils problem.

Anyway, it's common knowledge about how important the lesser-of-2-evils
problem is in our own U.S. elections. Progressive voters are afraid
to express what they really want. I call that a real problem. 
Condorcet is what gets rid of that problem best.


Mike


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