Or Combinations

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

The regular Condorcet method only compares two candidates (choices) head to
head in each pairing.

Should there be all of the multiple combinations of *or* candidates (choices)
in pairings for use in tie breaking (in addition to all of the regular
Condorcet one vs. one pairings) ?

In other words, should *absolute* votes be used in addition to the *relative*
rankings used in Condorcet pairings ?

Example- 4 candidates- A,B,C,D
Reminder- it is absolute votes being counted for the candidate or candidates
on each side of the *vs.*.

1. one vs. all of the others
A vs. (B or C or D)
B vs. (A or C or D)
C vs. (A or B or D)
D vs. (A or B or C)
Note- this is the plurality method with its nonmajority winner
 possibilities.

2. two vs. all of the others
(A or B) vs. (C or D)
(A or C) vs. (B or D)
(A or D) vs. (B or C)
(B or C) vs. (A or D) *
(B or D) vs. (A or C) *
(C or D) vs. (A or B) *
Note- the combinations marked * duplicate the top combinations in reverse
order and are included only to show all combinations at the left.

Note- this would indicate divided majorities. 
With 5 or more candidates the combinations of divided majorities would become
rather complex.

Should the highest (or any) majority of all the voters cause wins or losses
(either absolutely or as a tie breaker) ?

3. three vs. all of the others (equals above one vs. all of the others in
this example)
--
A reminder---the following main competitors to Condorcet (despite their well
known wrong-majority defects) will generally produce a de facto majority of
all voters (MOAV) winner in a single winner election-- (a) Majority
Preference Voting (MPV) a.k.a. Instant run-off (IRO), (b) Top 2 in Runoff (in
use in some States for partisan runoff primaries and in very many States for
nonpartisan elections) and (c) Approval Voting (AV).

If Condorcet does not produce a majority of all voters (MOAV) winner in
public elections, then it will certainly be totally attacked (and probably be
totally destroyed).