Divided Majorities and Minorities

[DEMOREP1 at AOL.COM]

In multi-candidate elections for a single office using a Condorcetish method
when one candidate does not beat each other candidate head to head, one can
look at the election as being a case of having a divided majority and a
divided minority. 

Assuming that there is a zero vote for unacceptable candidates, then a
majority can zero out such unacceptable candidates.

Thus, the remaining candidates, if any, would be more or less tolerable to
the majority.

However, if the majority group is divided, then the minority group can cause
a less tolerable candidate to be elected.
Example: A, B similar; C,D similar
103 voters
2 A, B
51 B
26 C, D, A
24 D, C, A
The 53 A and B voters zero out C and D so they lose.
Thus, A beats B 52 to 51 in an ordinary Condorcetish manner. 

Thus, should a candidate have the option of not receiving a second (or later)
choice vote from a voter who voted a first choice vote for a candidate who is
zeroed out ? 
In the example, candidate A may not want the votes from the C and D voters.

Or, in other words, should a majority of the voters be able to pick a
candidate from the group of candidates who have tolerance by a majority
(which would reduce manipulation by defeated minorities) ?

Noting however, that if it was *obvious* that a minority candidate had no
chance of being elected, his/her supporters might then give their first
choices to the less tolerable candidate in the majority group anyway.

I again point out that if (a big if) there is separation of legislative and
executive powers and if (another big if) proportional representation elects a
majority rule legislative body, then it *relatively* less important who are
the executive and judicial officers.