Ranking Array Math

Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Tue Jun 11 02:54:44 PDT 1996


DEMOREP1 wrote:
-snip-
>With multiple candidates, there may not be such a winner. Thus, the
>need for a tie breaker. Which tie breaker to use is definitely not
>obvious and is arbitrary. 
-snip-

I don't like the use of the word 'arbitrary' here.  The word has
several definitions, including "determined by whim or caprice"
(American Heritage Dictionary).  

To me your sentence connotes there's a lack of good reasons behind
any of the tie-breakers, but I think there are sensible standards on
which Condorcet outperforms other tie-breakers (and methods),
including reducing the incentives for voters to vote in ways that
aren't sincere.

pro {{Maximize sincere expression {{Condorcet

(For elaboration, reread the messages having to do with the failures
of manipulation to affect the results in Condorcet.  Bruce posted an
example of manipulation succeeding in Condorcet, but it depended on a
group having far more knowledge than other voters of the vote totals.
Note that Bruce *didn't* claim that there are *any* methods which would
be invulnerable to manipulation under such extreme circumstances.)

By extension, maximizing sincere voter expression will improve 
*sincere majority* rule.

pro {{Majority Rule {{Condorcet

So I'd prefer if you revise your message, replacing that sentence
with one which indicates that the choice of tie-breaker is sensitive
to which standard(s) the electorate considers important. 

---Steve     (Steve Eppley    seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)



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