Mock Election & Results

[Steve Eppley]

Mike O wrote [in the ER list]:
-snip-
>At least in Approval there's never need to actually falsify a
>preference ordering, which seems to put it ahead of most
>rank-balloting count methods. 
-snip-

That's not the way I view Approval.  Here's an example Approval
vote, expressed using a restricted form of my ordering syntax:
   A=B=C=D > NOTB > E=F=G=H

If this voter's preference ordering is actually 
   A>B>C>D > NOTB > E>F>G>H
then I'd say this voter has to falsify his preferences, and in a way
which matches Mike's definition of drastic defensive strategy.  So
what does Mike mean? 

---Steve     (Steve Eppley    seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)