Example with contrary half preference votes

Mike Ossipoff dfb at bbs.cruzio.com
Sat Jul 13 00:26:52 PDT 1996

This example for margins vs votes-against is the same one that
I just used for the compulsory falsification issue:

Sincere preferences:

46%: Dole, Clinton, Nader
20%: Clinton
34%: Nader, Clinton, Dole

Dole voters truncate:

46%: Dole
20%: Clinton
34%: Nader, Clinton

If we use votes-against, as specified by the rule for
Condorcet's method, then Clinton wins. The truncation
by Dole voters can't change the fact that Dole has a majority
against him, nor can it change the fact that Clinton doesn't
have a majority against him.

If we go, instead, by margins of defeat, Dole wins, meaning
that the truncation by Dole voters has taken the victory from
the Condorcet winner & given it to the candidate of the
truncators. The wishes of the majority that indicated that
they'd rather have Clinton than Dole is violated. GMC &
LO2E-1 are violated. The Nader voters would have better optimized
their outcome if they'd insincerely voted Clinton in 1st place.
That's just what we don't want anyone to feel compelled to do.

(In a pairwise comparison, margin of A's defeat by B is
gotten by subtracting the number of voters who voted A over
B from the number who voted B over A).



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