[EM] MSC reply

[Mike Ossipoff]

DEMOREP1 at aol.com writes:
> 
> Regarding
> Subj:  Re: [EM] Multiple Same Choices
> Date:  Tue, Feb 27, 1996 7:10 AM EDT
> From: dfb at bbs.cruzio.com (Mike Ossipoff)
> 
> My response--
> A. The values in the Multiple Same Choices posting are choices of levels, not
> points. For example if there were 100 candidates a voter could have 30, 40,
> 50, 99 or 100 choices of levels.

There's nothing about the definition of Condorcet's method for counting
ranked ballots that prevents those ballots from having more than 1
candidate at any rank position.

> 
> B. With just 3 candidates (with 2 of them being "extremists") a "middle"
> voter has some elementary strategic voting to do for his/her second choice
> (who might be a minus 99.9 percent choice versus a minus 100 percent choice)
> as shown in my posting of 

Which method are you referring to? With the methods you've been proposing,
defensive strategic voting would indeed be necessary, as I've been saying.

> Subj:  [ER] Single Winners- Condorcet versus Approval
> Date:  Fri, Feb 16, 1996 4:22 AM EDT
> involving the Hitler-Stalin-Middle example. 
> 
> Does Mr. Condorcet say that a voter cannot have 2 or more equal first (or
> later) choices ? If so, Mr. Condorcet is anti-freedom of choice.

No, I don't know of Monsieur Condorcet ever having said that. And,
as I said, there's nothing about his ballot-counting rule that
prevents you from listing as many candidates as you want at any rank
position. If you list A & B in 1st place, then, by the Condorcet count
rules that I've stated, you aren't counted as ranking A over B or B
over A, but you're counted as ranking both over C. No one is trying to
take away your freedom. On the contrary, the methods that you've proposed
take away the voter's freedom to have all of his preferences counted fully.

Having said that, I should add that, with Condorcet's method, though you
can rank as many 1st (or Nth) choices as you want to, there's no strategic
need to rank them equal unless you really consider several candidates to
be exactly equal and are unable to choose which to rank over the other.
When, as is usually the case, you have a preference between A & B, 
you have no reason not to express that preference with Condorcet's method.

> 
> C. The test winner, test loser and test other losers terminology is the same
> as what the Condorcet method does in making pair comparisons- one of the pair
> is a test winner, one is a test loser. The first choice votes for each of the
> pair and the votes transferred from the other first choice candidates (test
> other losers) for one of the pair determines which of the pair is a relative
> winner. Saying that the Condorcet method compares the votes each of two
> candidates receives as if there were only those two candidates may be good
> enough for speaking to folks but not for math examples on paper and election
> computer programmers.

Not at all. Saying: "A beats B if more voters rank A over B than vice-
versa" translates in an easy & obvious way to a mathematical example or
a computer program. The wording based on "test winners", "test losers"
& "test other losers" is unnecessarily wordy & roundabout, as is its
unnecessary use of vote transfers.

> .-
> 


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