Condorcet order-reversal problem? (was Re: First Debate on DEMOR

[Hugh Tobin]

Steve Eppley wrote:
> 
> Hugh T wrote:
> -snip-
> >The more difficult problem for Condorcet arises when B has more
> >than 40% first place support in an otherwise similar scenario (20%
> >middle), and B supporters thus could use order-reversal to create a
> >circular tie that B could win.
> 
> I presume you meant A, not B, since the other examples used B to
> represent the middle candidate.
> 
> How about posting an example?
> 
> ---Steve     (Steve Eppley    seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)

I meant DemoRep's B, who gets the second-place vote from the supporter
of his middle candidate, M. Mike says the M voter will truncate to deter
this strategy, even though that could elect A (whom the M voter
despises) if B voters are not deterred by the M voter's stated intent to
truncate, and even though it would be unnecessary to carry out the
deterrent strategy if its announcement had produced the intended effect
on B voters.  I think the M voter is in a tough spot here, but agree
with Mike that this rather special case is a minor problem compared to
tactical opportunities in IRO.  Examples have been discussed previously,
but time permitting I'll post one again.

-- Hugh Tobin