Standards, IRO and Condorcet

[Hugh R. Tobin]

Recent postings by a prolific exponent of Condorcet may have overstated
both the existence of, and the necessity for, unanimity with respect to
the importance of certain underlying standards among those who prefer
Smith//Condorcet to IRO.

If IRO is politically the principal alternative to Smith//Condorcet,
then perhaps S//C supporters should not put undue emphasis on certain
standards that are not essential to the comparison of those two systems,
particularly if those standards are not accepted as intuitively obvious
by all electoral reformers, or are questioned by rigorous academics such
as Bruce Anderson.

In order to conclude that Smith//Condorcet is preferable to IRO, I do
not think it is necessary that one (a) believe that the "Majority Rule"
or "LO2E" standards, as stated on this list, are important, (b)
understand why the proponents of those standards assert that they
implement the concepts expressed in their titles, or (c) understand how
Smith//Condorcet may be considered a "direct restatement" of those
standards.

I have voted for Smith//Condorcet over IRO not because of those
standards, but for two basic reasons:
(1)  IRO will elect candidate A, who would lose a head-to-head race with
candidate B, in plausible circumstances where S//C elects B, the
candidate who  would defeat any candidate head-to-head.
(2)  IRO creates incentives to vote for less-favored candidates over
more favored candidates under broader ranges of circumstances than S//C,
and under plausible conditions may even reward strategies that involve a
portion of the backers of a plurality candidate voting for their last
choice first.

I think that to prefer S//C over IRO one need only believe that the
result of IRO in (1) above is undemocratic, or that it is important to
minimize the likelihood that voters' ballots reflect tactical choices
rather than their true opinions of the candidates. Would the major
spokespersons for Condorcet on this list agree?

-- Hugh Tobin