[EM] Condorcet question - why not bullet vote

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Juho,

--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Juho <juho.laatu at gmail.com> a écrit :
> > If you are using proportional completion (or
> "symmetric completion") then
> > you're not using winning votes, you're using margins.
> 
> The described algorithm seemed to make the completion in a
> "non-symmetric" way, leading to comparing the proportions of
> the A>B and B>A votes.

I see...

> > Juho advocates MinMax(margins) which is why he posted
> this example
> 
> Not really because of the minmax part but to cover also
> margins in addition to winning votes.

Not sure what you mean by that, as the example I posted works with both.

> > (Schulze is usually assumed to use winning votes), and
> also why he didn't
> > like it when I pointed out that clone independence and
> ISDA were the
> > probable answers to your criteria question
> 
> That was on the minmax part. Minmax doesn't meet the Smith
> criterion and clone independence (in some extreme
> situations). Also in this case I wanted to cover also those
> methods in the discussion (in addition to the usual Smith+WV
> ones and criteria that those methods meet).
> 
> Kevin Venzke is usually more on the WV and Smith set line
> (right?).

I rarely advocate Smith. I find it such a weak criterion that it's not
worth sacrificing much to satisfy it. I prefer CDTT or criteria that are
reminiscent of it, geared towards respecting full majorities.

> When it comes to real life elections I tend to think that
> all common Condorcet methods are pretty similar, and because
> of that similarity all the vulnerabilities and dramatic
> looking criteria do not mean that much in real elections.
> They make wonderful tools for propaganda though since one
> can construct dramatic looking (often just theoretical, not
> real life like) examples and criteria.

I admit your truncation example was more dramatic than mine.

Kevin