[EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Sun Jun 13 21:45:03 PDT 2010
At 10:09 AM 6/13/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>--- En date de : Sam 12.6.10, Abd ul-Rahman
>Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
>
> > Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at the "top of
> > their preference listings."
>
>That is inadequate to satisfy the criterion, which refers to candidates
>plural. Woodall's Majority is equal to what has been called "Mutual
>Majority" on this list.
Sure. It's more general in application than the
simple restatements of the Majority Criterion.
However, the plural includes the singular.
What I see with Plurality is that if a majority
of voters put the same set of candidates at the
top of their preference listings, on the ballot,
that candidate will win. That they only put one
candidate doesn't violate or negate that statement.
Below, Mr. Venzke provides a definition of
preference listing, which considers it a ballot.
My point, though, is not to insist upon one
particular interpretation, but to show that
interpreting and applying a preferential voting
criterion, as Woodall's Majority Criterion was
intended to be, to a voting system that isn't
constructed as expected, is not a way to
objectively judge the system, because one then
has to make a series of possibly biased judgments.
This really comes out when we start to examine
Approval voting. If a majority of voters prefer a
candidate over all others, showing that on the
ballot, with Approval voting, that candidate must
win. If they conceal this preference by also
approving someone else, that candidate might
lose. So ... does aproval voting satisfy this Majority Criterion?
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