[Election-Methods] elect the compromise

[Forest W Simmons]

On August 29 raphfrk wrote ...

>Most candidates would prefer a 45% chance that they will win >over a 
100% chance that they won't.  Their own personal utlities
>will swamp any difference in factional utilities.

I'm not sure about the "most" but it does seem true that at least some 
of the more ego stricken candidates would be less willing to compromise 
than their supporters.  [However, in the challenge, if C voted for 
himself above A or B, it didn't register.]

So (in the challenge example) asset voting based on random ballot might 
do no better than plain random ballot, if A is one of those big ego 
types.

Is there a possibility of asset voting where the candidate proxies are 
more constrained by their supporters?

Even DYN, which delegates less power to the proxy than asset voting, 
might benefit from more good ideas along these lines.

Perhaps candidates should be required to publish their range ballots 
before the election, and their "trading" of assets should be required 
to be "rational" relative to these announced ratings?

Or perhaps, a randomly chose jury of candidate X supporters should have 
some say in the candidate X proxy decisions?

Forest