[EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Tim Hull]

I think that MMP variant creates the top-up party list based on the
strongest losers from each party and then does the rest as in standard MMP
by allocating seats based on parties.

I do wonder, though, how it would work if one did a non-party based variant
of MMP where a certain percentage of the legislature is constituency
representatives (possible 2/3) and the rest at-large, with the at-large
seats filled with the best overall losers by percentage of the vote..  This
would be a semi-proportional system, though I wonder how close to being
proportional it would in fact be.  One could simulate such a system based on
the real results of a legislature to see how it would work - I wonder how
this would change the makeup of, say, the UK or Canadian parliament or
Australian House of Representatives (the U.S. House probably wouldn't change
much based on current results, as the Democrats and Republicans constitute
some 97% of the overall vote and their numbers are already roughly
proportional).

Tim

On 4/25/07, Chris Benham <chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>
>
> Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
>
> Tim Hull wrote:
>
>    Condorcet, on the other hand, does not suffer
> from the center squeeze.  However, it suffers from the opposite problem -
> the so-called "Pro Wrestler" or "Loony" syndrome in an election with a
> couple polarized candidates and a weak centrist or joke candidate.  In my
> student government elections, I picture this being a candidate walking
> around campus in a clown suit and winning based on becoming everybody's #2.
> Also, Condorcet's later-no-harm failure may mean people give a less sincere
> ranking than in IRV, though this failure is far less so than in range.
>
>  This is a potential problem with all pure Condorcet methods.
> It might be able to be overcome with some restrictions
> Candidate must have >5% first preference votes or be one of the top 5
> candidates in number of first preference votes.
> Or some other restriction might help.
>
>
> I can see why this is a marketing/propaganda problem, but not why it is a
> *real* problem.
> One reason why not is that Condorcet gives serious candidates incentive to
> contest the centre so if the
> election is serious then at least one serious centrist will run and one
> will win. If the election isn't serious then
> why is "polarised candidate" necessarily a better winner than a weak
> centrist or even a "joke candidate"?
>
>  While I agree party lists are "rotten".
>
> there are lots of other multi winner PR systems, that don't require a
> party list
> MMP where the "top-up" comes from the best of the losers.
>
>
> How exactly does this version of  MMP work?
>
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
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>
>
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