[EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?
Howard Swerdfeger
electorama.com at howard.swerdfeger.com
Mon Apr 23 11:59:44 PDT 2007
Juho wrote:
> On Apr 23, 2007, at 17:40 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
>
>>> Range is expressive and it is able to treat these two different
>>> types of "Pro Wrestlers" differently. Its problem is that it in
>>> practice easily becomes Approval (only min and max values used)
>>> in competitive elections.
>> does it?
>> I have seen arguments stating that a knowledgeable voter would
>> alter there preferences in this manner. But I am unsure if this
>> would happen in the reality of a large scale (>10^5 voters) election.
>
> Let's say that in the U.S. presidential elections roughly 48% of the
> voters vote D=9, R=7, PW=1 and roughly 48% vote R=9, D=7, PW=1.
> Either D or R wins. In the next elections the Democrats notice the
> possibility of strategic voting and advice their supporters to vote
> D=9, R=0, PW=0. In these elections Democrats win. In the third
> elections Republicans have learned a lesson and now recommend their
> voters to vote R=9, D=0, PW=0. Now the election is in balance again,
> but the method has in practice reduced to Approval (actually
> Plurality in this example).
I agree with the basic math of optimization. But, I still question its
application to voter intent.
> This strategy doesn't require the voters be rocket scientists.
> Probably the strategies would not spread as described above. Maybe
> there just would be discussions between voters and in the media and
> all parties would be impacted in roughly same speed. In competitive
> elections it is quite possible that majority of voters would not stay
> "sincere" but would vote in Approval style. Once strategic voting
> becomes wide enough to be meaningful to the end result, voting
> sincerely could be commonly seen as "donating the victory to the
> strategists". A key property of this evolution process is that those
> parties and individuals that are strategic will have more voting
> power than others (this breaks the possible balance of having same
> percentage of strategic voters in each party).
I agree strategic voters will have more power.
> I think the size of the election doesn't influence much on if voters
> become strategic. I think it is more like a balance of media / yellow
> press interest, strength of rumours, overall requirement of "good
you are probably correct.
It might depend on Other values, also.
Specifically I feel it might depend largely on the perceived
effectiveness honest voting.
In America there is a culture of voting for one of the duopoly because
in voting for anybody else there is a perceived (and actual) lack of
effectiveness.
However in Many other Countries, Canada, France, Germany....Votes are
given to many different parties in large numbers. I believe that this is
because there is often actual/perceived (opposition parties, 2nd round)
reward for voting the 3rd or 4th party.
In retrospect I might guess that there would be an a direct relationship
between number of voters and chance that the election would degrade to
approval.
In US style Presidential elections where there is 10^8 voters there
would be little reward changing your ranking away from the party suggested
Dem = 1
Rep = 0
Nader = 0
PW = 0
But with smaller number of voters (10^4 -> 10^5, ie parliamentary
system ) average voter opinion would change much quicker (noise) and you
might see results (more MP's) within 1 or 2 elections, voting true
preference.
Your perceived reward for honest voting then goes up. and you are more
likely to vote honestly.
anyway, (side tracking for a moment) I am mainly of the opinion that
very large elections should not be conducted in a single winner method
if there is any other possible way.
> moral" in the society, and (maybe most importantly) the level of
> competitiveness in the elections in question.
If by competitiveness you mean 2 candidates close in popularity leading
everybody else.
>
> Juho
>
>
>
>
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