[EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Sat Apr 21 21:37:29 PDT 2007
At 03:28 PM 4/21/2007, Juho wrote:
>Some voters may think that the candidates know the political
>questions better and are better up to date than the voter himself/
>herself. Some think the other way around. Both OK. The voter may be
>confident in his/her opinions and finds deviations from them
>uncomfortable. Another voter learns from what the candidates say and
>changes his/her opinions accordingly.
In my opinion the one who properly decides if a voter is competent to
vote on a topic that affects him or her is the voter himself or
herself. The protection against incompetent voting in a
direct/democracy Delegable Proxy or Asset Voting system is that the
individual voter *may* vote, but is not required to and is not asked
to by the system. The default is that someone you choose votes for
you. But it is entirely up to you whether or not you want to vote on
your own behalf.
With Asset Voting, to vote yourself you register as a candidate and
simply vote for yourself. I expect that there might be some fee
associated with registration, but it should be minimal, essentially
enough to cover costs, and costs would be kept to a minimum. A
booklet might be published listing all registered candidates in a
jurisdiction, with a code to be used for actually voting. (Asset
makes it practical for *many* candidates to make themselves
available, because no longer are small numbers of votes wasted.)
(And this is, of course, in a system where direct voting is possible,
direct voting in the assembly. It might be over the internet, it
might not be. Asset makes it possible for direct voting to take
place, because electors under asset are public voters and it is known
who is carrying their votes in the assembly, so assembly votes can be
adjusted as necessary by direct votes. Basic Asset Voting does not
necessarily lead to the allowance of direct voting, it merely makes
it possible.)
>Some voters may trust trust the candidates, some not. Both OK. The
>new method may be so good that it makes the candidates/
>representatives less corrupt than before. But there is also the risk
>that candidates will use their negotiating power (e.g. in Asset
>voting) to gain personal benefits.
Risk? I find this astonishingly naive. We are talking about
candidates for public office, who will serve in assemblies with
legislative power. The *status quo* is that many representatives
already "use their negotiating power to gain personal benefits."
Those benefits may be political -- which is not necessarily corrupt
-- or personal, some of which involves corruption. What is so
frequently overlooked by commentators on Asset Voting and Delegable
Proxy is that there is *already* negotiation for the exercise of
power, but it happens at the next state, in the legislature (as well
as during campaigns, involving funding and support.)
So the question is not whether Asset will lead to the abuse of
negotiating power, for such abuse, if it is abuse, already exists.
The question, rather, is whether or not it will make it worse or better.
Remember, in Asset the votes are public. If I've voted for so-and-so,
he or she may not know that I voted for him or her, but I know. And I
know where my votes went, generally. If they go somewhere due to
corrupt influence, why would I be satisfied with this?
In Asset systems as in Delegable Proxy, the voters main focus is on
the voter's link to the hierarchy, and on the path up that hierarchy.
It is far, far easier to watch that path, to watch what, precisely,
is being done with one's vote, not only in seating members of the
assembly, but in votes subsequent to that, than it is under current
systems as well as in most of the more advanced systems being
proposed. There is *responsibility.* Representation is still shared,
in one sense, but in another it is *personal.* I can take my vote
away from the representative. (In direct voting systems, I can do so
by voting. In delegable proxy systems, we usually assume that the
proxy can be revoked at any time, in addition to being effectively
canceled on a vote per vote basis by a direct vote cast by the client.)
> Some may consider it better not to
>open doors for the temptations,
If it weren't so damaging, this would be hilarious. We operate in a
system which is thoroughly vulnerable and manipulable by special
interests. The door is wide open *now*. With Asset, we can start to
watch the door!
Delegable Proxy goes further, but delegable proxy, structurally, is a
fractal. On the biological analogies, that's absolutely appropriate,
but many people seem to have a lot of difficulty wrapping their head
around it. I point out that, to the base level client, it looks
extremely simple. There is a single clear path from the client to the
top. That this path is cross-linked massively should not distract
from that simplicity. But, still, DP would create top-level
assemblies where the members have variable voting power, and some
fear that this would give too much power to some individuals. I
disagree, but propose Asset as something fairly equivalent that does
not allow too much concentration in the hands of a single individual.
(The voters could collectively decide to give all their votes to a
single candidate, which would indeed give that candidate great power.
But I think, first of all, that this is not a likely outcome, by any
means, and it would only happen if, in fact, someone existed who was
so massively trusted. In an Asset environment, this person would
effectively appoint the legislature, the person could not keep the
power for personal exercise.
Delegable Proxy and Asset both are systems of representative
democracy (possibly combined with direct democracy) that allow the
citizen vast freedom in the choice of representative. The freedom
seems absolute in delegable proxy, and restricted in a way under
Asset, but the difference is illusory. Top-level assemblies for large
jurisdictions *must* restrict participation rights; this fact has
typically led analysts to conclude that direct democracy is
impossible. But that is because the concept of separating voting from
floor rights, quite simply, was overlooked. It is the right to
participate directly in deliberation that must be restricted. Scale
does not make it impossible for everyone who wishes to do so to vote.
Again, many considerations of direct democracy have noted, correctly,
that the average citizen cannot possibly have the resources to be
able to vote intelligently on the complex decisions which need to be
made in modern assemblies. And a likely result would be that only a
subclass of citizens actually vote, skewing the results toward those
desired by the people who have or make the time. And fanatics and
extremists are far more likely to do this than, say, the average
worker. But proxy voting rebalances the situation. The average
citizen remains represented, and the task of that citizen,
politically, is reduced to making a good choice in proxy or Asset
candidate, and then in watching that representative.
Both Asset and DP allow representation choices to be made on a small
and intimate level while still concentrating representation on a large scale.
As to vulnerability to corruption, the issue is complex. DP is
probably less vulnerable, but DP is not practical for political
purposes, in many environments, unless base-level proxy assignments
are secret. While both Asset and DP are, in my opinion, far less
vulnerable to corruption than present systems, the possibility still
exists. Whenever there are fixed nodes of power, there are weak
points where corrupt leverage can be applied.
Fortunately, there is a solution which goes even further. And,
miracle of miracles, it is a solution which can *precede* the
creation of public Asset or DP systems. It is to create independent
organizations which do not collect power. These are *not*
governments, they do not have coercive power, they cannot tax or
assess. They do not make collective decisions, in the end, though
they may express the degree to which consensus has been found on an
issue. This, of course, is FA/DP. It can start *now*. It merely seeks
communication and coordination.
With FA/DP, the power, the resources, remain with the individual
members, as well as with traditional organizations which these
members create that are *not* Free Associations, though they may be
DP in control structure.
A great deal already exists which bears this or that characteristic
of FA/DP. Essentially, it's coming. Watch.
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