[EM] PR-STV and vote management
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Fri Apr 20 07:55:43 PDT 2007
At 01:18 PM 4/19/2007, raphfrk at netscape.net wrote:
>I was thinking about an easier solution to the vote management problem.
>This is where it is sometimes in a party's interests to try to split
>their support
>equally between two candidate due to exhausted ballots. In effect, they
>get a candidate elected without a quota.
In systems where there is discretion in vote reassignment, as with
Asset, I have recommended that the quota be the strict proportional
quota. For an assembly with N seats representing V voters, every seat
is elected V/N voters. Yes, not rounded off.
And, yes, there may be a seat left vacant, where those holding the
remaining votes can't agree and compromise on some member. (I have no
idea how rare or common this would be. It could be a large enough
problem that more than one seat remains vacant. But I see some social
benefit in the loss of representation of people who are unable to
compromise! -- which compromise need not be on one who matches their
opinions, but rather on one they can trust to *consider* their views
and to present them to the assembly where appropriate. It is also
possible for a member to be pledged to vote as instructed by some
process agreed upon by disparate factions compromising on that
member. I *don't* recommend this! If we understand, however, that
present systems give these relatively isolated groups no
representation at all, that they might, under some conditions, remain
without representation, is far less a problem that it might otherwise
appear.... STV, for example, gives them no opportunity at all.)
If we further (as a separate reform, it does not need to be the
original one) allow electors to continue to vote at the assembly
level when they choose to do so, these isolated groups will lose only
deliberative rights, not voting rights.
Frankly, it looks like an ideal system to me. No compromises except
what is absolutely necessary because of scale.
(That is, there are no compromises at all if there is a procedure for
electors to revoke their votes and thus effectively recall their
chosen proxy in the assembly. That is a more difficult problem which
I don't care to address at this time. It is a problem that doesn't
even have the opportunity to exist at this time, when there are no
public voters, and recall is a massive and cumbersome process, and
not even practical with an STV assembly. -- many members would lose a
majority vote on a recall election! if they represent unpopular
factions, or, alternatively, if the member must get a quorum of
support in a recall, one has asked the entire electorate to
participate in order to affect one seat. Highly inefficient and, for
that reason, dangerous. No, public voters are necessary for recall
and direct voting procedures to even become possible.)
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