[EM] PR-STV and vote management

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Fri Apr 20 07:55:43 PDT 2007


At 01:18 PM 4/19/2007, raphfrk at netscape.net wrote:
>I was thinking about an easier solution to the vote management problem.
>This is where it is sometimes in a party's interests to try to split 
>their support
>equally between two candidate due to exhausted ballots.  In effect, they
>get a candidate elected without a quota.

In systems where there is discretion in vote reassignment, as with 
Asset, I have recommended that the quota be the strict proportional 
quota. For an assembly with N seats representing V voters, every seat 
is elected V/N voters. Yes, not rounded off.

And, yes, there may be a seat left vacant, where those holding the 
remaining votes can't agree and compromise on some member. (I have no 
idea how rare or common this would be. It could be a large enough 
problem that more than one seat remains vacant. But I see some social 
benefit in the loss of representation of people who are unable to 
compromise! -- which compromise need not be on one who matches their 
opinions, but rather on one they can trust to *consider* their views 
and to present them to the assembly where appropriate. It is also 
possible for a member to be pledged to vote as instructed by some 
process agreed upon by disparate factions compromising on that 
member. I *don't* recommend this! If we understand, however, that 
present systems give these relatively isolated groups no 
representation at all, that they might, under some conditions, remain 
without representation, is far less a problem that it might otherwise 
appear.... STV, for example, gives them no opportunity at all.)

If we further (as a separate reform, it does not need to be the 
original one) allow electors to continue to vote at the assembly 
level when they choose to do so, these isolated groups will lose only 
deliberative rights, not voting rights.

Frankly, it looks like an ideal system to me. No compromises except 
what is absolutely necessary because of scale.

(That is, there are no compromises at all if there is a procedure for 
electors to revoke their votes and thus effectively recall their 
chosen proxy in the assembly. That is a more difficult problem which 
I don't care to address at this time. It is a problem that doesn't 
even have the opportunity to exist at this time, when there are no 
public voters, and recall is a massive and cumbersome process, and 
not even practical with an STV assembly. -- many members would lose a 
majority vote on a recall election! if they represent unpopular 
factions, or, alternatively, if the member must get a quorum of 
support in a recall, one has asked the entire electorate to 
participate in order to affect one seat. Highly inefficient and, for 
that reason, dangerous. No, public voters are necessary for recall 
and direct voting procedures to even become possible.)




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