[EM] MultiGroup voting method
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Fri Apr 6 09:17:16 PDT 2007
At 09:52 AM 4/6/2007, Juho wrote:
>Here's one method for PR multi-winner elections. [...]
>
>Candidates (or parties) are free to form any kind groups. Some
>typical groups are parties and regions. The groups are allowed to be
>hierarchical and to overlap. Also mandatory groups can be covered
>within the method (all candidates might e.g. be mandated to represent
>one of the regions).
Is Juho aware of the use of Asset Voting that I have proposed? It
seems far simpler and more flexible than what Juho has proposed, with
similar effect. It also has overlapping "groups." The groups are
created by the candidates when they assign their Assets. They can
choose to reassign votes in precinct blocks, approximately, so, if
they have enough votes, they can create regions that are connected in
some way, with a single representative. Where they don't have enough
votes, they can reassign the votes to someone else, and, if enough of
those amalgamated votes come together, they can still form regions
smaller than the whole state, but more commonly would create
state-wide constituencies.
A popular representative, perhaps the leader of a party in the state,
could create relatively small districts. A political party that was
small and spread thin, but with enough loyal voters, state-wide, to
gain a quota of votes, would gain representation state-wide. A party
with even less support than that, could cooperate with other similar
groups to create a seat that represents more than one party,
presumably with similar agendas or interests.
It takes no complex, top-down, imposed system. All it takes is
allowing votes to amalgamate intelligently, i.e., under the direction
of a trusted candidate. And my position has been that if we can trust
a candidate to exercise our vote in the legislature, which is what
representatives do, we can trust the candidate with what is actually
a lesser task, that of choosing who is to represent the votes involved.
(I might trust someone absolutely, but also know that this person,
for whatever reason, is incapable of serving. Maybe they are
terrified of public speaking, maybe they have other responsibilities
that would prevent it, etc.)
With Asset Voting, even if I don't trust an individual, I can assign
fractions of a vote to a virtual committee.... Asset, in its
Fractional Approval Asset Voting incarnation, takes a very simple
ballot, it is just like a plurality single-winner ballot, but I can
vote for as many as I like. My vote is distributed equally among all
those I vote for. These votes are, as in all Asset methods, available
to be assembled to create winners at the discretion of the candidates
holding them.
If it weren't so common, I'd be nonplussed by those who object that
this gives the candidates too much power. Those candidates, if
elected, are going to have *greater* power when they are serving.
They will amalgamate votes, at their discretion, to create winning
resolutions. What's the difference?
The fact is that Asset doesn't need to consider party affiliation at
all. Parties can continue to function, and I assume that some
candidates will only distribute Assets within their own party. But
that is actually up to them, and they are responsible before the
voters for what they do.
Asset Voting wastes no votes. If we allow the transfer of fractional
votes, seats can be an *exact* quota. Normally, slop might result in
a missing seat. However, I see no harm in having a legislature with,
say, 30 seats, but it might be 31 if the candidates manage to
assemble all the votes. (It might be less if they really can't agree,
and this problem is widespread.) As a voter, if my chosen candidate
failed to distribute a significant number of votes, I'd really not
like it and I would be likely to not vote for that candidate again.
It is also possible to use a ranked ballot to reassign seats, with
exhausted ballots (none of the candidates ranked on the ballot are
chosen immediately) being assigned, then, to the candidate listed
first, or to more than one if more than one is listed first. Then it
functions as Asset. We could call it STV-Asset. I'm just not sure
that the gain in direct voter power is worth the complexity of the
ballot. To me, it would be a fish bicycle. Why should I second-guess
the candidate I trust the most? He or she probably has much better
knowledge than I of the possible persons to serve....
[...]
>Finding the optimal outcome as defined above is computationally
>complex.
Of course it is. What Juho is trying to do is to automate a process,
using fixed rules, instead of allowing human intelligence, which is
far more flexible and which can deal with unanticipated
contingencies, etc., to allocate votes and seats.
The Asset scheme that I've proposed allows the candidates to create
districts on the fly. They don't have to, but there is very little
reason for them not to. All they have to do is to transfer votes in
precinct blocks. It's possible to define a procedure whereby seats
are entirely allocated from intact precincts, but at the cost,
obviously, of precision in representation. Because this loss would be
small, it could be acceptable, but it complicates things
unnecessarily, in my view.
Instead, if a candidate is assigning, say, fifty precincts to a
candidate, and there are some votes left over, a fraction of a
precinct, that candidate would simply assign the extra wherever it
might be useful. If I'm from one of those 50 precincts, even though
perhaps 1% of my vote went elsewhere, I'd still consider the
representative to be mine. The difference is minute. Precincts aren't
anonymous, but they are still relatively small units, so its easy to
get close enough for folk music, as they say.
It wasn't clear to me how Juho's scheme really differs from Asset
Voting, it seems to function similarly, but he proposes, if I read
correctly, this or that restriction intending to have this or that
supposedly desirable effect. I think that trying to get party or
"group" representation by manipulating the rules is, quite simply,
unnecessary. As long as voters can freely choose candidates, and
especially the candidate they trust most, and access to the ballot is
easy, with perhaps minor candidates being listed on a supplemental
booklet so that voters can enter a number rather than write in a
name, it will be the voters who determine what kind of groups are
represented. Candidates can make various pledges, if they want, and
voters can pay attention to these pledges, or not. Candidates could
pledge to reassign votes according to a candidate list (and this is a
special version of the method we have called Candidate List), but I'd
make that optional. Quite simply, I don't want to say "I trust you,"
and then, "Well, no, I don't trust you, you must do A and B and, if
necessary, C." What's the point of having a representative if you
have to instruct him or her? We don't allow instruction of
representatives in Congress, why should be allow it in the process of
choosing representatives. Rather, a good system must properly require
voters to use their intelligence *in choosing whom to trust.* It's a
much simpler decision, actually, rather than having to consider
electability -- which is not relevant to Asset --, party affiliation
--, it's up to the voter to determine if this is important or not, -- etc.
I didn't invent Asset. Warren Smith did. But it is such an obvious
scheme that I think we should consider it clearly and openly and only
introduce complexity if, in the light of this, it seems necessary.
Rather than considering what we'd want representatives to do, then
trying to create Rube Goldberg schemes to force them to do it. I like
to be free and I want my representatives to be free as well. If I
don't trust them, I should vote for someone else.
(And, one will note, under Asset it is possible for any citizen to
become an "elector," by receiving votes, which might even be as
little as one vote, and, because electors are not anonymous, it is
also possible to allow electors to vote in the assembly, though not
to routinely participate in deliberation. Thus we could possibly have
solved the problem of scale in democracy, without losing the security
and practicality of representative democracy. For such a simple
scheme, that's quite a possibility!)
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