[EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 27
Gervase Lam
gervase.lam at group.force9.co.uk
Thu Apr 26 16:09:17 PDT 2007
> Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2007 18:52:05 -0400
> From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
> At 05:12 PM 4/20/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
> >I disagree:
> >Imagine a classical 2D political spectrum:
> >http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:2d_political_spectrum.png
> >
> >with 1 voter in the middle (0,0) and 3 candidates
> >Candidate A is at (0, 1)
> >Candidate B is at (0, -1.1)
> >Candidate C is at (0.5, 1)
> >
> >If the voter votes for the candidate closest to them on the political
> >spectrum there preference would be
> >A > B > C
> >
> >But if A is allowed to transfer my votes he would choose the one closest
> >to Them IE C.
>
> What Swerdfeger is pointing to is nothing more than the obvious. The
> first preference of my first preference is not necessarily my second
> preference. You don't need math to see that! I'm not voting for a
> clone of myself, but for someone I trust.
I don't see any problem in applying the spectrum idea to
trustworthiness. Each dimension could represent some aspect(s) of
trustworthiness of each candidate.
A very simple example could be one dimension represents trustworthiness
on health services while the other dimension represents trustworthiness
on economic matters. A physician and economist would fit easily into
this example.
Thanks,
Gervase.
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