[EM] IFNOP Method (was Re: Question about Condorcet methods)
raphfrk at netscape.net
raphfrk at netscape.net
Tue Oct 24 07:35:23 PDT 2006
For example:
A>B>>C
A:99
B: 98
C:0
B>>C>A
A: 0
B: 99
C: 10
C>A>B
A:60
B: 0
C: 99
3 way tie
votes are then changed to
A=B>C
B>C=A
C>A=B
Result:
A>B -> B wins
A>C -> draw
B>C -> B wins
B wins
Total range scores:
A: 159
B: 197
C: 109
So, B also wins range. The main point is that it allows voters to decide
which preferences they will compromise on first. The least important
preferences (to the voter) are eliminated first.
You are also right that it will degenerate to approval. The approval
threshold will be set between the 2 candidates which have the largest
difference in score.
The range winner would not necessarily win under this system though.
If the majority want someone else, they can elect that person.
Raphfrk
--------------------
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wikocracy.com
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