[EM] IFNOP Method (was Re: Question about Condorcet methods)

raphfrk at netscape.net raphfrk at netscape.net
Tue Oct 24 07:35:23 PDT 2006


 For example:
 
 A>B>>C
 A:99
 B: 98
 C:0
 
 B>>C>A
 A: 0
 B: 99
 C: 10
 
 C>A>B
 A:60
 B: 0
 C: 99
 
 3 way tie
 
 votes are then changed to
 A=B>C
 B>C=A
 C>A=B
 
 Result:
 A>B -> B wins
 A>C -> draw
 B>C -> B wins
 
 B wins
 
 Total range scores:
 A: 159
 B: 197
 C: 109
 
 So, B also wins range. The main point is that it allows voters to decide 
 which preferences they will compromise on first. The least important
 preferences (to the voter) are eliminated first.
 
 You are also right that it will degenerate to approval. The approval
 threshold will be set between the 2 candidates which have the largest
 difference in score.
 
 The range winner would not necessarily win under this system though.
 If the majority want someone else, they can elect that person.
  Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com  
________________________________________________________________________
Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20061024/770fb56c/attachment-0001.htm>


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list