[EM] IFNOP Method (was Re: Question about Condorcet methods)

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

 From: davek at clarityconnect.com
 
 > Given: 
 > 35 A>C 
 > 33 B>C 
 > 32 C 
 > 
 > I see: 
 > IRV will discard C, letting A win. 
 > Condorcet will see 65 C winning over 35 A 
 > 
 
 The point is that the later no harm property means that there is no 
 incentive to truncate your ballot.
 
 If A's supporters changed to
 
 35 A
 33 B>c
 32 C
 
 The result becomes
 
 A>B: 35 > 33
 A<C: 35 < 65
 B>C: 33 > 32 
 
 Thus, A supporters have shifted the vote from a C win to a tie (which 
 is an improvement, unless B wins the tie-break). Thus, it is in their
 interests to truncate, if their ranking is A>>>C>B.
 
 The end result may be that voters will start truncating/bullet 
 voting, getting us back to plurality. 
 
 > I LIKE Condorcet. What does this mean below? 
 
 I was saying that to preserve the later no harm property, you must do 
 something like IRV.
 
 This results in a loss of access to some of the ranking information, but
 at least it doesn't create an incentive to not rank candidates.
 
 The other option is to make it compulsory to rank all candidates.
 
 Actually, would randomly completing uncompleted ballots create an 
 incentive to fully rank all the candidates even in condorcet ?
 
 > 
 > DWK 
 
    Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com   
 
 
   
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