[EM] Re: Definite Majority Choice, AWP, AM

[Araucaria Araucana]

On 26 Mar 2005 at 04:05 UTC-0800, James Green-Armytage wrote:
> Hi Juho,
> 	Some replies follow, on the subject of voter strategy and
> approval-weighted pairwise. These comments should also be helpful for
> others who don't understand why I consider AWP to be clearly better than
> DMC and AM.

[... arguments ...]

>
> 3 candidates: Kerry, Dean, and Bush. 100 voters.
> 	Sincere preferences
> 19: K>D>>B
> 5: K>>D>B
> 4: K>>B>D
> 18: D>K>>B
> 5: D>>K>B
> 1: D>>B>K
> 25: B>>K>D
> 23: B>>D>K
> 	Kerry is a Condorcet winner.
>
> 	Altered preferences
> 19: K>D>>B
> 5: K>>D>B
> 4: K>>B>D
> 18: D>K>>B
> 5: D>>K>B
> 1: D>>B>K
> 21: B>>K>D
> 23: B>>D>K
> 4: B>D>>K (these are sincerely B>>K>D)
> 	There is a cycle now, K>B>D>K


I agree that AWP (have you decided to pick between RP, Beatpath or
River?) does a better job in this particular case, and all else being
equal, I would be happy with an AWP proposal.

But all things are not equal.  How do you explain to your 80 year old
auntie about ordering the defeats, or that RP sometimes gets a
different result than Beatpath or River?  If you can show that AWP
always causes the 3 strong pair-ranking methods to get the same
answer, I would be convinced.

Until then, I think DMC or some variant is the Condorcet method with
best chance of public acceptance.

In any case, my general comment about strategy not existing in a
vacuum still applies here: though Bush does win under DMC using your
proposed strategy, it is very risky.  What if 3 of the 5 D>>K>B voters
move their cutoff below K?  Yes, they would be compromising, but in
approval and not in rank.  B voters attempting to "game" DMC are
gambling on how important that approval cutoff decision will be, and
could end up with a Dean victory for their efforts.

Ted
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