[EM] Re: ruminations on ordinal and cardinal information

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Ted!

You wrote:
> First point: High Approval score indicates broad consent that the
> candidate is minimally acceptable.  But it doesn't indicate highest
> preference.
Agreed.

> The main effect of Approval in DMC is to use it to discount the
> pairwise defeats of candidates with less widespread support.  But it
> is still possible for a minority block of voters to express
> "lesser-of-evil" preference among candidates approved by the majority.
Yes.

> Approval Cutoff also has an effect similar to AERLO/ATLO, which we
> should also consider strongly desirable -- we want to encourage voters
> to express a preference between approved candidates without fear of
> hurting on or the other.  
Right.

> If you end up ignoring that preference,
> you're no better off than with straight Approval.
I do not suggest to ignore pairwise preferences, only to give them no
more meaning than approval information!

> Second point: In the USA, at least, it may be more desirable for the
> pairwise winner to have lower approval.  This seems paradoxical, but
> it tends to keep the winner from making overly radical changes.  
Sorry, but I think some radical changes in the US are just what the US
(and the world) need :-)

> The
> US founders distrusted government enough that they put in checks and
> balances to make the process *less* efficient.
There is something similar in Germany: the federal government often
depends on the agreement of a majority of the federal states'
representatives, and this often leads to nothing happening at all...

> Thirdly, choosing the Direct Support winner from P will tend to
> discourage a more generous approval cutoff and encourage bullet
> cutoffs.  You're right back with something little better than
> Plurality again.
OK, I agree, that was a stupid suggestion and was only made because I
wanted to bring in direct support in some non-random way for lovers of
determinism.


But now the main point:
> Consider your DMC tie problem:
> 
>        1 A>>B>C
>        1 B>>C>A
>        1 C>>A>B
>        3 A=B=C
> 
> With DMC, however, a fourth candidate will see the opportunity and
> step in to fill the center -- if not in that election, then in a
> future one:
> 
>        1 A>>D>B>C
>        1 B>>D>C>A
>        1 C>>D>A>B
>        3 A=B=C=D
> 

Well, thank you for giving this example. Since it shows perfectly why I
think that the Condorcet Winner (in this case D) is sometimes NOT a good
choice at all! Most probably this D is just someone who has no program
and says nothing but empty phrases which oppose noone. I at least don't
think D should be elected here since s/he has too few approval and/or
direct support!

Yours, Jobst