[EM] Re: Burying and defection with the "defeat-droppers".

[Jobst Heitzig]

Dear Chris and James!

James answered to Chris:
>> 46 abc 
>> 44 bca (sincere is bac)
>> 05 cab
>> 05 cba
>> 
>> So the obvious question I ask you is this:  Why then do you
>> reccomend methods that  elect B?
> 
> Do I? First of all, my recommendation of winning votes methods is 
> tenuous. Second, I suggest that this would be an unrealistic winning
> votes example, because I expect that in a real wv election of this
> type, most of the A>B>C voters would truncate before B, and most of
> the B voters would truncate before A. My primary single-winner
> recommendation is cardinal pairwise (CWP). I find it highly unlikely
> that CWP would pick any candidate other than A in this example.

I would like to note that also in "Random Ballot among the not strongly
defeated candidates", the election will probably end up electing a: With
sincere votes
  46 a>>b>c
  44 b>>a>c
  05 c>>a>b
  05 c>>b>a
or
  46 a>>b>c
  44 b>>a>c
  05 c>a>>b
  05 c>b>>a,
a is both Condorcet and Approval winner. When the b voters only
order-reverse,
  44 b>>c>a,
the pairwise defeats say a>b>c>a, but approval still says a>b>c, hence b
and c are still strongly defeated and cannot win. Only if the b voters
even lift c above their approval cutoff,
  44 b>c>>a,
the situation changes to approval c>a>b, so that now a and b are
strongly defeated and c wins, which is of no help for the b voters.

Comments?

Yours, Jobst