[EM] Re: Chris, equal-ranking incentive

[Chris Benham]

Mike,
Beginning with a quote from me, you wrote
(Fri.Mar.18):

"'I object far more to the "equal-rank near the top"
incentive that exists for some voters (including
"zero-info." voters) in equal-ranking allowed  Winning
Votes
defeat-dropper.'

I reply:

Remember that it's been shown that every nonrandom
method gives some kind of incentive for strategic
voting."

CB: Yes, but not in the zero-info. case. I don't think
that DD(WV)'s  0-info. incentives combined with its
vulnerability to Burying and defection is the best
bargain.
I'll be elaborating more on alternatives in a later
post.

"The equal-ranking incentive that you describe is    
gotten rid of by AERLO."


I  am strongly of the view that as far as possible,
the result of the election should be determined purely
by the voters, who are nominally (or "in theory")
voting sincerely. Therefore I'm opposed to explicit
strategy devices, "candidate withdrawal options",
candidate proxy, and reliance
(before-absolutely-unavoidable)on random devices.

 "Still, it would be a nice luxury for everyone to
have no incentive to do other than sincerely rank
those better-set candidates."


I am sure that SCRIRVE, and doubtless some other
methods, fill that bill. I think the "Definite
Majority Choice" idea recently floated here of having
the voters enter an approval cutoff in their rankings 
and then the method eliminates all candidates who are
pairwise beaten by more approved  candidates;  is 
promising.

Continuing from the previous quote:

"AERLO ensures that. That isn't the only value of
AERLO. It, along with ATLO, also is a way to make
order-reversal-deterrence easier." 


I   am  not  really a huge fan of   "deterrent
strategy".

Chris Benham




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