[EM] Markus, criteria similiar to majority rule definition

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Markus--

You said:

Then I proposed the following criterion in 1997:

   If p(wv)[A,B] > V/2 and p(wv)[B,A] < V/2,
   then candidate B must be elected with zero
   probability.

Steve Eppley proposed the following criterion in 2000:

   If d[A,B] > V/2 and p(wv)[B,A] < V/2,
   then candidate B must be elected with zero
   probability.

I reply:

Yes, but to outdo a majority pairwise vote, it's necessary for that MPV to 
be in a cycle of MPVs _all of which are at least as strong as it is_.

That's how my majority rule definition differs from your criterion and from 
Steve's Beatpath Criterion.

By the way, Steve's  Beatpath Criterion is very useful for determining 
compliance with the majority defenisive strategy criteria. A method that 
meets BC meets all the majority defensive strategy criteria. I've never 
defined BC in a universallly applicable way, because I've only used it for 
testing rank methods for compliance with the majority defensive strategy 
criteria.

Mike Ossipoff

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