[EM] Conversations with people new to voting systems

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sat Mar 26 16:47:53 PST 2005


Propose CR Instead Of Approval:
---------------------------

I've  mentioned these facts before, but recent conversations re-confirm 
them.

Someone I was talking to recently objected to Approval, because of a concern 
that the person who votes for more than one candidate has more power than 
someone who only votes for one candidate. We all are familiar with the 
answers to that objection, and it was the topic of much discussion on the 
Approval mailing list. But that objection to Approval is very widespread.

Though it can be answered, people don't always listen to the explanation, 
and even if you get the opportunity to answer that objection, you won't 
always convince the person you're talking to. I've spoken with people who 
remained unconvinced, and who continued to believe that Approval gives more 
power to some people, and is more unfair than Plurality or IRV in that way.

I told here and on the Approval mailing list why Plurality makes more 
voting-power disparity than Approval does, when voting-power is defined in a 
way so that it can vary among voters.

But unless you believe that you'll be able to reach each and every voter, 
and talk to him/her enough to convince him/her that the voting-power, or 
one-person-one-vote, objection isn't valid, then it would be better to 
propose something that isn't subject to that objection.

So then, when that person in that recent conversation objected to Approval 
on the grounds of unequal voting power, I suggested that CR be proposed 
instead. The familiar point system. He said that's a much better proposal.

He's right. I've never heard the unequal voting power objection or the 
1-person-1-vote objection to CR.

Some object that CR requires new balloting to implement it, while Approval 
doesn't. But what good does it do to have easier implementation, with a 
method that people don't accept?

Propose CR Instead Of a Rank Method:
---------------------------------

In another recent conversation, someone pointed out to me that with a rank 
method, people who don't have a good understanding of the count mechanics 
and its consequences aren't going to believe that it's ok to rank Nader over 
Kerry if the important thing is to help Kerry beat Bush. That person seems 
to be right, because, not long before that conversation, I showed to a 
friend one of the polling websites, the excellent masquilier polling 
website, and invited her to vote in its presidential election.

She ranked Kerry in first place, followed by a list of other similar 
Democrats, even though she agreed that Nader is more honest and has better 
policy proposals.

So, aside from the fact that a rank method is more difficult to enact, 
because there are innumerable ways to count rankings, and it's necessary to 
show that your rank-count is the best one, there's also the problem that 
even if you get it enacted, people won't make use of what it allows them to 
do, show support for their favorite over everyone.

As I mentioned a few days ago, maybe, with a rank-method, a person would be 
willing to vote Nader equal to Kerry. Or maybe not, if s/he doesn't 
understand the count and its consequences. But even if so, we're no better 
off then than we would be with CR. So why not propose CR instead?

CR"s count and its count are simple and obvious.. With CR, it's 
transparently obvious that no one has any reason to not give maximum points 
to their favorite--that giving maximum points to compromise Kerry is in no 
way weakened by also giving maximim points to favorite Nader.

As I was saying  before, Condorcet wv is my favorite, because of SFC & GSFC 
compliance. And Approval is my favorite CR version, disregarding 
winnability. But we can't disregard winnability.

Let's all support something good that's winnable: CR.

Mike Ossipoff

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