[EM] Sincere methods

Juho Laatu juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Tue Mar 22 23:15:52 PST 2005


Hello All,

In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best 
Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury 
of sincere votes. I would appreciate your comments on this. Possible 
answers could be e.g.
- one method that is best for all or most single winner elections
- one of few good methods depending on the targets of the election 
(different method for presidential elections and for selecting the best 
day for a meeting)
- any method (= anyone can be elected if there is no Condorcet winner)
- any method as long as it elects from the Smith set (Smith set is an 
example of a criterion that many seem to respect)

I already gave some support to seeing MinMax (margins) ("least 
additional votes") as one potential "sincere method" (criticism 
received too). I think Mike Ossipoff indicated some support to the idea 
that different methods could be the best choice for different 
elections. Any examples of a voting method that is the best in some 
certain environment would be welcome too. It would be interesting to 
understand how much "sincere methods" and "strategic methods" (i.e. 
methods that try to defend against strategic voting) differ from each 
others or if they are sometimes even the same thing.

Any opinions?

Best Regards,
Juho




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