[EM] Demonstrations that BeatpathWinner meets WDSC & SFC
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Fri Mar 18 20:11:47 PST 2005
WDSC's premise says that a majority of the voters prefer X to Y. WDSC's
requirement says that they must have a way to ensure that Y loses, without
reversing a preference.
If that majority rank X over Y, then Y has a majority defeat. A majority
defeat is a 1-defeat majority beatpath. Therefore there's a
majority-strength beatpath from X to Y.
Can there be a majority-strength beatpath from Y to X? Well, say that that
majority don't rank Y. That means that they aren't ranking Y over anyone.
That means that X can't pairwise-beat anyone by majority. Since every
beatpath must start out with a defeat, that means that there can't be a
majority beatpath from Y to anyone, including X.
And that means that there's a majority-strength beatpath from X to Y, but
not from Y to X. The strongest beatpath from X to Y is stronger than the
strongest beatpath from Y to X. That means that Y can't win, because someone
(X) has a beatpath win against Y.
That majority were able to make Y lose merely by ranking X over Y, and not
ranking Y over anyone. They didn't have to reverse a preference in order to
make Y lose.
[end of demonstration that BeatpathWinner meets WDSC]
While we're at it, how about why BeatpathWinner meets SFC:
SFC compliance is tested only in examples in which there's a CW, because its
premise mentions a CW.
The premise of SFC says that no one falsifies a preference, and that a
majority prefer the CW to Y and vote sincerely. The requirement says that Y
shouldn't win.
By my definition of sincere voting, if voters are allowed to rank as many
candidates as they want to, a sincere ranking must vote all of the voter's
preferences.
So the stipulation that a majority prefer the CW to Y and vote sincerely
means that that majority rank the CW over Y.
As before, that gives Y a majority defeat, which is a 1-defeat majority
beatpath from the CW to Y.
Can Y have a majority defeat to the CW?
In the previous demonstration, I mentioned that a majority beatpath
obviously must start with a majority defeat, since all of its defeats must
be majority defeats. Likewise, a majority beatpath must end with a majority
defeat. For a beatpath from Y to the CW to end with a majority defeat, the
CW must have a majority defeat.
Can the CW have a majority defeat if no one falsifies a preference? If for
any candidate Z other than the CW, it must be that more prefer the CW to Z
than prefer Z to the CW. That's the definition of a CW. That means that
there can by no majority preferring someone to the CW. And, if no one
falsifies a preference, then there can be no majority voting someone over
the CW. That means that the CW can't have a majority defeat. Since a
majority beatpath must end with a majority defeat, that also means that
there can be no majority beatpath from anyone to the CW.
Since there's a majority beatpath from the CW to Y, and there can't be a
majority beatpath from lY to the CW (because there can't be a majority
beatpath from anyone to the CW), then the CW has a beatpath win against Y.
That disqualifies Y from winning, by the definition of BeatpathWinner.
So, as required by SFC's requirement, when SFC's premise conditions are met,
and the method is BeatpathWinner, candidate Y can't win. BeatpathWinner
meets SFC.
[end of demonstration that BeatpathWinner meets SFC]
In my earliest advocacy of wv, I pointed out that Worst's majority defeat
will be recorded, preserved, and always counted. I pointed out that that
means that majority rule will be honored, and that lesser-of-2-evils voters
will be reassured that their pairwise vote against Worst will be recorded
and preserved, as will its effect in reducing Y's winnability, as described
by WDSC and SFC. I pointed out that those things aren't so in margins.
Those things affect Worst's ability to win in BeatpathWinner just as surely
as they do in PC or Smith//PC, as shown by the demonstration above.
Those are general facts about wv, arguments in general for wv.
As I said in an earlier reply: Though voting systems are important, I'm only
doing this because I like to, with no goals regarding results. That's
because what someone else does or doesn't do isn't my department. But it's
fun to find out what kind of opposing arguments I get. The lengths to which
some people, like Markus, will go are remarkable, and often hilarious, and
provide much entertainment.
Mike Ossipoff
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