[EM] Russ, 12 March, '05, 0645 GMT

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Russ says:

IIRC, I said SFC could be well-defined if it were based on a clearly
specified model of "true" voter preferences. But then it is only as good
as that model.

I comment:

I posted an explanation of why, for my criteria to be well-defined, it 
doesn't matter if preference is well-defined, or if it's meaning is unknown, 
or if it even has a meaning.

And I asked you if there's some particular sentence in that explanation that 
you take exception to. But instead of saying why you disagree with that 
explanation, you merely keep repeating your claim that my criteria that 
mention "prefer" are only as good as a clearly-specified model of preference 
that they're based on.

Perhaps you, Russ, haven't read the conduct guidelines for EM. You're asked 
to not keep repeating a claim without responding to the answers that have 
been posted to that claim.

But, since you seem to have missed it the first time, I'll repeat something 
that I said before. Maybe an example will help.

WDSC says (with a little wording-neating) "If a majority of the voters 
prefer X to Y, then they should have a way of voting that will ensure that Y 
won't win, without reversing a preference."

I've defined reversing a preference as voting some X over some Y, and 
preferring Y to X.

I posted an example in which a majority are said to prefer B to A. For 
brevity I'll refer to them as "that majority". The example said the 
preferences of the voters. In that example I specified the ballots of the 
voters not in that majorilty. Why not? For the method to comply with the 
criterion, it mustn't be possible to write any example in which the 
criterion's premise is met and its requirement isn't met. The example-writer 
can say anything that isn't inconsistent with the criterion's premise 
conditions.

And, from what is said in that example, the only way the members of that 
majority could keep A from winning was for some of them to reverse a 
preference, by some voting B over C, though they prefer C to B. Or for some 
voting C over A, though they prefer A to C.

Now, do you think that it matters what "prefer" means, or that a "model" of 
preference is needed?

WDSC's premise stipulates that a majority prefer some X to some Y. The 
example says that 199 of the 349 voters prefer B to A. No matter what, if 
anything, preference means, the example complies with WDSC's premise, with 
respect to that majority.

If what is written in the example, whatever, if anything, it means, were 
true,  then, for that majority to keep A from winning, some of them would 
have to vote in a way that I've defined as "reversing a preference", given 
what the example says about whom they prefer to whom.

Likewise, the definition of reversing a preference is unaffected by what 
preference means. If people said in the example to prefer C to B vote B over 
C, then, by the definition of reversing a preference, they're reversing a 
preference. And that's true whatever "prefer" means.

I made a stronger claim when I said that it doesn't even matter if "prefer" 
means anything.

How could that be so?:

The question that has to be asked, when considering a criterion failure 
example is: If what is  written in the example were true, would the 
criterion's requirement be met, when the tested method is used?

I said _if_. That's important. If "prefer" doesn't mean anything, then no 
sentence that has "prefer" as its verb can even be a statement, much less a 
true one. But that's irrrelevant, because I said "_If_ what is written in 
the example were true...".

Russ continues:

Mike doesn't see a need for such a model because he
doesn't understand the underlying problem of basing his criteria on
"true" voter preferences.

I comment:

You haven't shown an underlying problem. Nor have you named a particular 
sentence that you don't agree with in my explanation for why a definition or 
model of preference isn't needed.

I'd said:

Is that criterion of yours supposed to be in some way a counterpart
of SFC? Your criterion is a method-dedicated criterion, of course,
mentioning margins.  SFC doesn´t mention winning-votes.

Russ says:

No, SFC doesn't explicitly mention winning votes, but it implies it.
That was my main point.

I comment:

Then you didn't support your main point. Anyway, for any criterion, meeting 
that criterion "im;lies" some method or type of method. If a method is 
"implied" by a criterion, then we say that that method passes the criterion. 
Insofar as the criterion sounds important to you, then the method is a good 
one.

The only time there's something to criticize there is if the criterion is 
nothing but a restatement of the method.  But even that has nothing wrong 
with it unless the criterion can't be justified in some  other way.

So, even if the majority defensive strategy criteria were just restatements 
of wv (but they aren't), there's be nothing wrong with that unless you can 
show that they can't be justified on their own merits, and that therefore 
they seem to have been contrived jut to make wv look good.

But I've told why I wrote the defensive strategy criteria. I arrived at wv 
by seeking a kind of method that would do well at avoiding drastsic 
defensive strategy need. The strategy goals led to the method. As I said, 
very soon after proposing wv, I was posting to EM criteria that were early 
versions of SFC, WDSC, and SDSC, as measures for my goal of minimizing 
defensive strategy need.

>SFC stands for Strategy-Free Criterion, because, with complying
methods, the majority described in SFC´s premise doesn´t need any
strategy in the plausible situation of that premise.

Russ continues:

What is it about a majority of voters that is so special?

I reply:

As I've frequently said, a majority of the voters is a group that's big 
enough that it's possible to make certain guarantees about its need for 
strategy. That's it. That's why I speak of a majority of the voters. Don't 
look for other reasons.

Russ continues:

Suppose we
have a proposition on the ballot, and the result is 47% to 44%?

I comment:

Then we can say that "Yes" pairbeats "No", and would win in any Condorcet 
version, without being a majority defeat.

I assume those are percentages of those who turned in valid ballots that 
voted on other contests.

Russ continues:


Do we
say it didn't pass because a majority of the voters did not approve it?
Of course not. It passes. Why? Because a majority of the voters WHO
VOTED ON IT approved it -- and that's all that matters.

I reply:

Fine. Likewise, as I said, Condorcet would elect Yes in that 2-alternative 
election, because Yes pairbeats its only opponent, and is therefore CW.

Russ continues:

But Mike thinks that if voters abstain from voting on a particular
Condorcet pairwise race, then their opinion should still matter in terms
of setting some significant threshold.

I reply:

That's news to me. I haven't spoken of the opinion of people who didn't vote 
on a pair.

But I've said that a majority of the voters is a group large enough that we 
can make certain guarantees about its strategy need.

Russ continues:


If that's true, then why not
count the registered voters who didn't bother to vote at all (either for
that particular office or for the entire election)?

I comment:

Because it isn't necessary. Because a majority of the voters is enough to 
ensure certain basic but important guarantees.

But I encourage you to advocate versions of my criteria that instead use 
those other majorities. When you do, you'll find that your change in the 
kind of majority that you refer to doesn't change the fact that wv meets the 
majority defensive strategy criteria, and margins fails them.

Russ continues:

If only half of the
registered voters even bother to show up, why isn't the "majority"
threshold for your SFC the majority of all the registered voters? Or all
the eligible voters even if they aren't registered?

I comment:

You've asked that question twice. Refer to my answer to your first asking of 
the question, directly above your second asking of it.

Russ continues:


I think your criterion is inconsistent. It defines a majority in terms
that include voters who didn't see fit to vote on a particular pairwise
race, but it doesn't account for voters who didn't vote at all for that
office or for the entire election.

I comment:

But you forgot to tell us in what way you think that it's inconsistent to 
speak of a majority of the voters.

I'd said:

Anyone can write a criterion such as the IRV criterion that says that
a method passes the IRV criterion if it chooses IRV´s winner.That´s
essentionally what your "Margins SFC" is.

Russ says:

And that is essentially what your SFC criterion is too, except that it
is written for wv Condorcet.

I reply:

Which part of SFC restates the rules of wv Condorcet?

Ruiss, you're sloppy, as I've already told you.

But even the IRV criterion would be worthwhile if it could be justified in 
some way on its own merits.
And even if SFC were a restatement of wv (but it isn't), I justify SFC on 
its own merits. I tell why it's desirable that a method meet SFC. SFC was'nt 
written to make wv look good after wv had been chosen for some reason other 
than its strategic properties. The strategic goals led to wv, and to the 
criteria which were written as measures of success with that goal.

I'd said:

>That´s been answered many times. You´ve shown that a pairwise defeat
that is better by winning-votes can look not as good by margins.
Amazing. It´s because wv and margins are different.

Russ says:

Yes, I'm sure it's been "answered" many times. What does that prove,
Mike? Does the truth of a proposition depend on how many times it's been
asserted? Apparently you think so.

I comment:

It's a waste of time to have to repeat everything for you.

I'd said:

>Russ wants us to count those 49 voters who voted against the 51-49
defeat. Some like to do that, saying that it´s more "symmetrical" if we
count them as we count the winning-votes.
>
>But, if X pairwise-beats Y, the X>Y voters and the Y>X voters aren´t
symmetrically related. Why?
>
>The Y voters lost.

Russ says:

But we're trying to resolve an ambiguity here, Mike. We *must*
ultimately choose a winner who "lost" to another candidate.

I comment:

That's what I'd said in the message that you're replying to :-) You're 
parroting.

Russ continues:

The question
is not *whether* something needs to give but rather *what* needs to
give. According to your impeccable "logic", nobody should win.

I reply:

Russ, check oiut what you've quoted me saying, directly below:

>If every candidate has a pairwise defeat, then, to elect someone, we
have to disregard their pairwise defeat, we have to overrule the
public´s statement that someone else would be better, if we´re to
appoint that person the winner.
>
>When we do that, we´re overruling the people who voted for the X>Y
defeat. As I said, we shouldn´t do that lightly. So don´t avoidably
overrule more voters than necessary, by using a count rule that doesn´t
distinguish the voters who won from the voters who lost.
>
>You see, Russ, if we keep the X>Y defeat, we aren´t overruleing the
Y>X voters. The Y>X voters were overruled when they were defeated in the
public vote between X and Y, when the public said that they collectively
prefer X to Y.

Russ says:

I know the whole song and dance, Mike. And it's nothing more than your
arbitrary "logic" about what should and shouldn't be "overruled."

I comment:

No, it's more a matter of who has already been overruled by the public's 
voted preferences. The Y>X voters have been so overruled.

Russ continues:

But
the bottom line is that, while you are perfectly willing to overrule a
49-0 defeat
, you consider a 51-49 defeat sacrosanct. That's arbitrary
whether you are willing to recognize it or not.

I comment:

As I said, it's common knowledge that you can contrive a situtation where 
the defeat that's better by wv isn't as good by margins. So what? Choose 
based on which seems more important, on its own merits. I've given you some 
suggestions for making that choice.

Mike Ossipoff

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