[EM] Why IRV is popular

[Russ Paielli]

James Green-Armytage jarmyta-at-antioch-college.edu |EMlist| wrote:
> Russ wrote:
> 
>>One of Jim's "criteria" was "system easily explained." Surprisingly, he 
>>put "somewhat" for both IRV and Condorcet.
>>
>>IRV is much easier to explain than Condorcet, and I believe that is the 
>>primary reason that it is more popular.
> 
> 
> 	Jim Lindsay is probably speaking from experience when he says that IRV is
> only "somewhat" easy to explain. He is the secretary of Californians for
> Electoral Reform, and I'm sure that he's been involved in promoting IRV
> for a long time.

Yes, but has he ever tried to explain Schulze or Ranked Pairs to the 
level of detail that someone would need to know to actually implement 
it? I can explain IRV to that level of detail off the top of my head, 
but I cannot do the same for the Condorcet defeat-dropping methods.

> 	I think that IRV is more popular than Condorcet because it is more of a
> known quantity. It has long been used in other countries without anything
> horrible happening, and it is very similar to the two round runoff, having
> few disadvantages, and an obvious advantage in terms of cost.

That is true, but it begs the question of *why* it has "long been used." 
Could it be that IRV has "long been used," in part, because it is 
relatively easy to explain and understand?

> 	Condorcet, on the other hand, remains a largely theoretical entity.
> People don't know exactly what the result will be from a Condorcet system,
> and so many are wary of it. IRV is safe, and Condorcet is not so safe. 
> 	The tradeoff, then, is between familiarity/safety, and the chance for
> radical change in our political system: hopefully one which displaces the
> two party duopoly that is so deeply entrenched in our political system, in
> favor of a more authentic democracy (rule of the people). Thus, I suggest
> that Condorcet tends to appeal more to people who are dissatisfied with
> our political system on a deeper level, and who are not satisfied with
> minor changes.

Oh, I think many IRV supporters are radical enough. They just mistakenly 
believe that IRV is the way out of the two-party system.

> 	Also, I suppose it's possible that Condorcet suffers a bit from the lack
> of broad consensus as to which Condorcet completion methods should be
> used. More on that later.

Absolutely.

> 	But another reason why IRV is so popular is that people are really active
> in working for IRV. For Condorcet to take off, there need to be more
> people pushing for its adoption on whatever level possible. Student

Whoa -- just a minute. Saying that IRV is popular because of its 
advocates is begging the question of why the advocates like it to start 
with. I think the underlying reason is that it is easier to understand 
and explain. Unlike defeat-dropping Condorcet schemes, IRV requires no 
sophisticated "algorithms." Counting first-choices and transferring 
votes is hardly a fancy algorithm.

> government elections are a good place to start. Mayoral elections for
> relatively small towns/cities. Church organizations, hobby groups, NGO's.
> Choosing between multiple options _within_ a council or other small,
> official group. Whatever! In other words, IRV is more popular because it
> has been blessed with more active supporters. So let's get out there and
> try to get Condorcet methods adopted, eh? Brainstorm a bit: of the myriad
> organizations that use voting, which are local enough and approachable
> enough for you to have a chance to convince them to use Condorcet?
> 	(For my part, I'll try to mount Condorcet and STV campaigns in whatever
> university I end up doing my graduate work.) 

But you have a problem, James. Which Condorcet variation will you 
promote? Until Condorcet advocates come together somehow, potential 
users will wonder why they can't agree on the best variation.

Regards,
Russ