[EM] Least Additional Votes. The importance of strategy.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

I'll get to Least Additional Votes after the other issues you brought up:

You wrote:

I guess often also the wish to make election results a linear preference 
order is present. This happens although we (in theory) already know that 
group preferences can not be presented as a linear preference order 
(although individual preferences maybe can). For this reason I don't feel 
quite comfortable with Condorcet completion rules that try to re-establish 
this linear structure of individual preferences also in the final results 
(since that simply is not natural for group preferences).

I reply:

But we can't avoid the matter just by not usng Condorcet. When there's a 
circular tie in preferences, electing someone will necessarily mean electing 
someone to whom someone else is collectively preferred by the electorate. 
Not collecting rankings, or not counting them pairwise merely conceals or 
ignores those preference, but they're still there.

Since, with a circular tie, we must elect someone who has a pairwise-defeat, 
then why not disregard the defeat that is supported by the fewest people?

You continued:

In the election methods mailing list I have in the recent months observed 
lots of discussion on criteria that are related to making the voting methods 
as strategy free as possible. Sometimes I have even gotten the impression 
that when electing the winner from the candidates in the top loop (Smith 
set) it could be anyone in the top loop, as long as the numerous strategy 
criteria are fulfilled.

I reply:

Well sure it could, and that depends on what one wants from a voting system. 
If someone values certain criteria, then yes, the right choice from the 
Smith set is the candidate chosen by a method that meets criteria that one 
likes.

You continued:

I guess this has not really been the case

I reply:

Well, it's the case for me, as stated in the previous paragraph of this 
reply.

You continued:

, but my point is that one should give high priority to selecting the 
candidate that we think is best, and maybe a bit less priority to all the 
strategical considerations.

I reply:

Sure, it goes without saying that the best thing would be to choose the 
candidate who is best. But the problem is when the voters don't agree on who 
is best. I claim that we deviate farthest from the best when we falsify our 
preferences, when we bury our favorite and fear to express what we want. 
That's why the strategy criteria are important.

You continued:

This is based on the assumption that strategical voting is not that easy in 
real life, at least not in elections where the number of voters is large.

I reply:

It happens in every election in the U.S. People say that they're abandoning 
their favorite to vote strategically. Millions do so.

You continue:

Many of the strategical voting cases are problematic only in situations 
where the voting behaviour of the voters is known. In real life this is 
seldom the case.

I reply:

The fact that the voters don't have good information on which to base 
strategy has never stopped them from attempting to vote strategically, by 
using the unreliable strategic information that they've heard from their tv.

You continue:

With this I want to say that sometimes sim
plicity
and/or "real life need" based rules may be more sensible than detailed 
strategy based criteria.

I reply:

But the defensive strategy criteria are very much based on real life need. 
That need, indicated by numerous conversaions with demoralized voters, led 
me to propose the criteria.

Must quit now. Will ask about Least Additional votes later. But it sounds 
like Dodgson, which doesn't do well by criteria, including, but not limited 
to, the defensive strategy criteria.

Mike Ossipoff

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