[EM] Therefore offensive order-reversal in wv won't look worse than Plurality
James Green-Armytage
jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Sun Apr 10 21:10:48 PDT 2005
James replying to Mike...
>For the offensive strategy to succeed, in addition to no counterstrategy
>being used, and in addition to A pairwise beating C, in addition to the
>B
>voters preferring A to C, it's also necessary that A be the sincere
>Plurality winner. That isn't necessary for IRV to have its problem.
...
>I've just posted a list of 5 conditions needed for offensive
>order-reversal
>to do what Plurality or IRV can do at any time, automatically.
>One of those conditions was that A be the sincere Plurailty winner.
>So, if A wins by offensive order-reversal in a wv election, after wv has
>replaced Plurality, and if someone says "Hey, they stole the election by
>offensive order-reversal. I want good old Plurality back!", then one can
>point out that that person that Plurality, under sincere voting, would
>have
>elected A anyway.
I don't understand what makes you say this. Candidate B wasn't the
plurality winner in the example that I gave you, and yet the burying
strategy by the B supporters is successful. Here's the example again.
Ex. 1: Sincere preferences expressed:
46: A>B>C
44: B>A>C
5: C>A>B
5: C>B>A
Ex. 1: Pairwise comparisons:
A>B 51-49
A>C 90-10
B>C 90-10
Ex. 1 winner: A
Ex. 2: Expressed preferences (some insincere):
46: A>B>C
44: B>C>A (sincere was B>A>C)
5: C>A>B
5: C>B>A
Ex. 2: Pairwise comparisons:
A>B 51-49
C>A 54-46
B>C 90-10
Ex. 2 winner: B
Sincerely,
James
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