[EM] No evidence that IRV doesn't fail. Reasons why it must.

[Eric Gorr]

At 7:43 PM -0500 1/22/04, Dgamble997 at aol.com wrote:
>This first example is countered with a second example which is 
>usually something like:
>
>47 A>B>C
>4  B>A>C
>2  B>C>A
>47 C>B>A
>
>in which B is the Condorcet winner with a very low percentage of the 
>first preference vote.
>
>In the first example IRV will probably elect the wrong candidate.
>
>In the second example Condorcet will probably elect the wrong candidate.

Condorcet did not elect the wrong candidate.  The voters were clearly 
split, but both of the larger groups preferred the third option over 
the primary opposition. As such, the highest utility candidate was 
elected by Condorcet.

Why do you believe that the first place preferences matter more then 
the middle or final preferences? What is the basis for this 
assumption?