[EM] Saari's Basic Argument
barnes99 at vaxa.cis.uwosh.edu
Thu Jan 16 20:42:21 PST 2003
In your example,
If you give second preferences any more than 16/33 of the weight which you
give to the first prefs, the winner is B; since:
Let's look at another example:
In this case, a second pref must be given less than 1/1,000,001 of the weight
of a first pref, if A should win. That's a stretch.
>===== Original Message From Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> =====
>Here's an example with the symmetry already subtracted out. [Add it back
>in and then subtract it out again if you want to.]
>A should be the winner, but Borda picks B.
>On Thu, 16 Jan 2003, Steve Barney wrote:
>> That's quite a strong claim you made there. I must have missed it. Please
>> me the number of the EM message in which you did what you describe below.
>> >From: Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>> >To: <election-methods-list at eskimo.com>
>> >Subject: RE: [EM] Saari's Basic Argument
>> >I've already given an example in which Borda gives the wrong answer after
>> >the symmetry is removed. Now you have given an example in which symmetry
>> >removal shows the CW to be wrong. So that evens the score :-)
>> >In other words, neither Borda nor Condorcet can claim to be superior on
>> >the basis of symmetry removal.
>> >So here's a new method (for three candidate races only): first remove all
>> >of the symmetry, and then the candidate with a majority of first place
>> >votes (on the remaining ballots) is the winner.
>> >This method beats both Borda and Condorcet by the "symmetry removal
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