[EM] Hello (Intro); PR, Condorcet and Approval, variants...

matt matt matt at tidalwave.net
Wed Feb 19 19:30:22 PST 2003


---------- Original Message ----------------------------------
From: Venzke Kevin <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
Reply-To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
Date:  Wed, 19 Feb 2003 08:59:54 +0100 (CET)

>I'm now more taken with Approval and Condorcet after
>reading about them.  I want the elected candidate to
>have the broadest base of support identifiable.  I
>have an issue or two with both systems, though. 
>Because of voter strategy, I worry that Approval would
>do little to "centralize" the elected candidates. 
>With Condorcet I worry that many voters would rank
>candidates into three groups: the favored candidates
>highest, the poorly understood candidates second (we
>have such candidates even under plurality; wouldn't
>their number increase quite a bit under Condorcet?),
>and finally, the disliked candidates.  I worry that,
>as a consequence, an "unknown" candidate could
>accidentally win, particularly if many voters lazily
>place unknown candidates in the same positions.

With wv as presented in this mail group, the voted disliked candidates are ranked ahead of "unknown" (nonvoted) candidates.  Thus the risk that a disliked candidate wins is greater than for an "unknown" candidate.  This has the advantage of discouraging candidates from running "stealth" campaigns at the cost of encouraging candidates to run "hate me" campaigns. It is possible to modify wv to place the non-voted candidates at the approval cutoff, but then it is not clear (to me) that this variation of wv retains all of the properties that wv advocates like.

>I am putting finishing touches on a system which is an
>Approval variant aiming to select the Condorcet Winner
>more often.  I hope to write a document on it.  First
>I have to make sure I can defend the system's results
>philosophically, but I'm very close to that point.  I
>also want to write a quick program or two to see if
>idiotic results ever occur in random scenarios (that
>is, compared with Approval's results).  I hope it will
>be interesting.

Approval completed Condorcet chooses the Condorcet winner if there is one and when there is no Condorcet winner it chooses the approval winner. 




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