[EM] Condorcet Flavored PR Methods

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Forest,

you wrote (27 Sep 2002):
> A "Condorcet Flavored PR Method" is an M-winner election method that
> (1) compares candidate subsets of cardinality M head-to-head, and
> (2) does the comparison in such a way that the winning combination
> of any head-to-head comparison provides better PR representation
> than the loser subset, and
> (3) gives the win to the "beats-all" combination if there is such
> a subset.

Tideman has proposed such an election method:

    T. Nicolaus Tideman, Daniel Richardson,
    "Better Voting Methods Through Technology: The
    Refinement-Manageability Trade-Off in the Single
    Transferable Vote," PUBLIC CHOICE, vol. 103,
    p. 13-34, 2000 (http://www.econ.vt.edu/tideman/rmt.pdf)

This paper by Tideman and Richardson is reprinted in this book:

    Shaun Bowler, Bernard Grofman, "Elections in Australia, Ireland,
    and Malta under the single transferable vote," University of
    Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000.

"Condorcet Flavored PR Methods" have also been discussed several times
in the journal "Voting Matters":

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/files/Voting_Matters_1-10_pdf.zip
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/files/Voting_Matters_12_pdf.zip
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/files/Voting_Matters_13_pdf.zip
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/files/Voting_Matters_14_Dec-2001.zip
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/files/Voting_Matters_15_Jun-2002.zip

Markus Schulze

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