[EM] Condorcet Flavored PR Methods

[Alex Small]

Forest Simmons said:
> If the method yields a "beats all" combination, then that combination
> is by definition better than any other combination according to
> whatever standard of "better PR representation" is being used in item
> (2) above.


I guess that formulating a criterion for "better PR representation" will
be addressed in a subsequent post.  The other major question that I see is
resolving cyclic ambiguities, although the stakes aren't as high as in
single-winner races because all of the M-member lists in the innermost
unbeaten set will presumably satisfy a large number of voters.

Question:  As interesting as it is to contemplate PR via Condorcet or
Approval, what are the odds of the public accepting these methods? 
Although the public uses computers, airplanes, and medications without
understanding the inner workings, they will probably demand more
transparency from an election algorithm.

I suspect that if we ever have PR on a wide scale in this country it will
be implimented via open party list (perhaps using Approval Voting within
each list), cumulative voting, or limited voting.  I suppose STV might be
implimented, but only because the most visible election reform
organization in the US seems to be CVD.



Alex


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