[EM] Confirmed!: Condorcet efficiency of IRV > 2-stage runoff

[Rob LeGrand]

Forest asked:
> Does anybody know of an example in which IRV would give a superior
> result to ordinary lone mark plurality in the case of near perfect
> information, assuming the use of near optimal strategy by the
> voters in both cases?

Sure.  Sincere preferences:

45:Reagan>Anderson>Carter
35:Carter>Anderson>Reagan
20:Anderson>Carter>Reagan

Plurality equilibrium:

49:Reagan
33:Carter
18:Carter   <--- insincere

IRV equilibrium:

49:Anderson>Reagan>Carter   <--- insincere
33:Carter>Anderson>Reagan
18:Anderson>Carter>Reagan

=====
Rob LeGrand
robl at aggies.org
http://www.aggies.org/robl/
for Texas State Representative, District 50

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