[EM] The good counter-example

[Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon]

I am sorry, I mixed up.
I am going for strike 2...
Summary:
I am trying to prove that a voter can enhance the result according to
its own
sincere preferences by truncation with ranked pairs using winning-votes.

I am even affraid I can do so when there exists a Condorcet Winner for
the
sincere preferences set.

Another time, to Mike, Adam, Alex and all winning votes criteria
advocates...

Dear friends,

here follow the sincere preferences of 11 voters when they judge
candidates A (Adam), B (Bart) and C (still no need for the joke).
2: A
2: A >B >C
2: B >A >C
1: B >C >A
4: C

With winning votes A (6) > C (5), then
                              B (5) > C (4), then
                              A (4) > B (3).
Note that A is the Condorcet Winner.
Margins as relative margins would produce the same result
with a different order.

The B >A >C voters (2) decide to believe Bart Ingles and truncate their
ballots to produce insincere votes,  namely B ballots:
2: A
2: A >B >C
2: B    (truncated!)
1: B >C >A
4: C

With winning votes the pairwise comparisons become:
B (5) > C(4) and C(5) > A(4), then
A(4) > B(3) is dismissed.
Bart wins...
Note that relative margins would preserve Adam's victory.
With margins it depends on the tie-breaker...

Do you surrender, this time?

Please tell me where I am wrong or explain,
Steph.
PS: Necessity is the mother of invention, but sometimes it leads
you to make a fool of yourself... However, try again.

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