[EM] Truncation

[matt at tidalwave.net]

On 18 Sep 2002 at 13:23, Adam Tarr wrote:

> Recently, there has been a revival of the debate about margins-based 
> Condorcet completion methods versus winning votes-based Condorcet 
> completion methods, with an eye towards the effects of truncation on 
> each.  Specifically, there is the remarkable fact that a voter in a winning 
> votes-based Condorcet voting system can NEVER be hurt by fully expressing 
> their preferences.  There are cases where fully voting your preferences can 
> fail to help you, but it can never actually hurt you.

Being new to this, I have another question regarding the impact of an alternative 
way of completing ballots:  The examples so far assume that the unranked 
candidates are ranked last. Would this truncation strategy free outcome not hold if 
unranked candidates were inserted at a voter specified approval cutoff that can be 
somewhere in the middle of the ballot?  Do you know?  Giving up ballot completion 
using an approval cutoff would result in an undesireable loss of ballot accuracy.

----
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), 
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em