[EM] Dual Dropping method and "Preference Approval" ballot ideas

[Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon]

I haven't yet got the time to re-write them but
merging the advantages of Approval, IRV and Ranked Pair
was the goal of methods I), J) and K) described as candidates
for the single-winner contest on the site
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Electoral_systems_designers/messages/113

Actually I) is Ranked-Pairs using relative margins as victory comparison
criteria.
It is the best criteria I can think of and I will still try to prove so
to Mr.
Ossipoff as our argument goes on...

J) combines all three methods advantages I wanted: it uses ranked pair
to rank
candidates so to minimize the highest twarted (how do you write that?)
majority,
IRV's sequential dropping so you can gather support of different
candidates
with similar philosophies and residual approval weights so ranking
unwanted
candidates should not harm any of your preferred candidate.  In
addition, it
produces weights as output so it can be used as a single-winner inner
motor
to produce a multiple-winners method with an exact proportional
representation.

K) shows how to generalize the popular IRV method to obtain weights as
output...

Unfortunately, the quality of my explanations could be enhanced...
Maybe I should not have given examples with ties, this complicates
the process.
Would you Matt be interested in reading them and give me some feedback?
It is the next job I have to do whatever.
Feel free to join my group too...

Steph.

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