[EM] Answers to selected Steph statements

[Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon]

>Steph continued:
>
>For me if you change a set of ballots S1 into a new
>set S2 by truncating
>some ballots, it is quite possible and normal to
>obtain a different
>winner:
>we have different ballots! Why would I preserve a CW
>of S1 as a winner
>if he is no more a CW of S2?
>
>I reply:
>
>He's still CW. Truncation doesn't change who's CW. CW
>is about
>sincere preferences, not votes. Nor does it
>change the fact that a majority of all the voters have
>indicated on
>their ballot that they prefer one candidate to
>another.

Once you face the S2 set of ballots "in the box",
how can you know if it comes
from an S1 set which has been truncated for strategical purpose,
or if S2 is the sincere ballot set? If you dismiss the 2nd case,
you assume sincere preferences cannot be of the kind
A > B > C > D = E = F. Why not ?

I agree with the importance of protecting from truncation
because there is no way of finding back the original set
S1 if truncation occurs. To obtain this incentive, we need
a negative esperance from truncation.
It is the case, with both (rm) and (wv).
You seem to think (rm) produces a positive mean gain.
It is just less negative than with (wv). On the other hand,
it maximizes equity as minimizing the biggest (twarted?, thwarted ?)
overturned majoriy...Thus it maximizes the probability of having
no wrong pairwise comparison.

It seems I cannot develop a semi-recursive evalution of results for
ranked-pairs as the number of voters increases. We will have to set
for a small number of voters as guideline, except if anyone has a better

idea...

Steph.


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